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TRANSPLANTATION AND ADAPTATION: 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN  
RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN 
Linda C. Reif* 
Abstract: The number of human rights ombudsman institutions has in-
creased dramatically over the past three decades. Such institutions are 
prevalent in Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe, and are 
increasingly found in other regions of the world as well. Forces such as 
democratization, public institution-building, comparative law influences, 
limited state resources, and international human rights law continue the 
spread of human rights ombudsman institutions. This Article discusses 
the mandates and jurisdiction of human rights ombudsman institutions. 
It argues that all governments should endow human rights ombudsman 
institutions with as many additional powers as their institutional and legal 
systems permit to supplement the ombudsman’s core investigatory man-
date. These include inspection, litigation, research, and education pow-
ers. Further, this Article argues that all human rights ombudsman institu-
tions must institute operating practices to increase their ability to protect 
and promote human rights. 
Introduction 
 In 1809, Sweden established the justitieombudsman, the predecessor 
of the modern institution of the ombudsman.1 The Swedish legislature 
appointed the ombudsman to supervise the conduct of the govern-
ment administration and the judiciary.2 It had the power not only to 
prosecute public officials, but also to pursue investigations and make 
recommendations to the government.3 Until the early 1960s, the om-
budsman institution could only be found in a few Scandinavian states.4 
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Dean (Graduate Studies), Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. Special 
thanks to Shannon Mather (LL.B., 2010) for her valuable research assistance. 
1 See Linda C. Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International 
Human Rights System 4–6 (2004). “Ombudsman” is the Swedish word for “representa-
tive.” Id. at 12. Because both women and men hold the office, the pronouns are neutrally 
used to reflect this fact. See id. at 1 n.2. 
2 Id. at 5–6. 
3 See id. at 4. 
4 See id. at 1. 
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Nevertheless, early in its history, the ombudsman’s mandates diverged.5 
While in Sweden and Finland the ombudsman had both prosecutorial 
powers and jurisdiction over the judiciary, the Danish ombudsman had 
neither of these functions.6 It was the Danish model that became popu-
lar in other jurisdictions around the world, particularly in Common-
wealth nations and some Western European states.7 The core function 
of this popular Scandinavian ombudsman model—the so-called “classi-
cal” ombudsman—is to investigate administrative conduct impartially 
based either on a complaint or the ombudsman’s own motion, to make 
recommendations, to rectify any illegal or unfair conduct uncovered, 
and to issue annual and special reports.8 The classical ombudsman is 
an institution that uses “soft powers” of persuasion and cooperation to 
control conduct rather than coercive or adjudicative means.9 
 Some schools of thought regarding common law and administra-
tive law refer to the ombudsman as a non-judicial alternative for over-
seeing public administration.10 Similarly, comparative law scholars oc-
casionally reference the ombudsman in discussions of comparative ad-
ministrative law, essentially using it as an example of a public sector 
institution that has been successfully transplanted in different legal sys-
tems around the world.11 Despite the changing face of ombudsman 
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. at 25. 
6 See Reif, supra note 1, at 2, 138. 
7 See id. at 6. 
8 See id. at 2–4. Even within the family of classical ombudsmen, there are variations be-
tween institutions. See id. at 3. For example, some ombudsmen do not have own-motion 
powers, some can inspect facilities such as prisons where persons are involuntarily de-
tained, and other ombudsmen are appointed by the executive rather than the legislative 
branch. See id. at 3–4, 406. 
9 See, e.g., Marc Hertogh, The Policy Impact of the Ombudsman and Administrative Courts: A 
Heuristic Model, in 2 The International Ombudsman Yearbook 63, 64 (Linda C. Reif ed., 
1998). 
10 See, e.g., Gerard Coffey, Administrative Law 73–79 (2009); Commonwealth Se-
cretariat, Comparative Study on Mandates of National Human Rights Institu-
tions in the Commonwealth 87 (2007); Paul Craig, Administrative Law 252–56 (6th 
ed. 2008); European Ombudsman-Institutions 22–23 (Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer ed., 
2008); Dennis Pearce, The Ombudsman: Review and Preview—The Importance of Being Different, 
in The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the Inter-
national Ombudsman Institute 73, 80–81 (Linda C. Reif ed., 1999); H.W.R. Wade & 
C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 74–93 (10th ed. 2009) (discussing the ombudsman’s 
power to review matters where legal remedy may be doubtful). 
11 See, e.g., John S. Bell, Administrative Law in a Comparative Perspective, in Comparative 
Law: A Handbook 287, 299 (Esin Örücü & David Nelkin eds., 2007) (“The Swedish system 
of independent administrative redress through the Ombudsman has been followed by many 
European states.”); John S. Bell, Comparative Administrative Law, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Law 1259, 1278 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
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institutions around the globe, the relevant legal literature primarily dis-
cusses only the Scandinavian or classical ombudsman model.12 
 Since the 1970s, governments around the world, on both national 
and sub-national levels, have established hybrid versions of the om-
budsman institution by giving one institution multiple mandates.13 
These additional mandates include protecting human rights, fighting 
corruption, ensuring ethical conduct by elected public officials, and 
protecting the environment.14 Even classical ombudsmen are being 
given “second hats” of differing scope with respect to freedom of infor-
mation, protecting privacy, child protection, and health system over-
sight.15 This Article specifically addresses the human rights ombudsman 
phenomenon—in other words, ombudsman-type institutions that are 
given express mandates to protect and promote human rights.16 
 By 2003, about half of the approximately 110 national-level om-
budsman institutions worldwide had human rights mandates.17 Many 
ombudsman institutions established since that time have also been 
given human rights-related duties, and classical ombudsman institu-
                                                                                                                      
12 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 59–62; Reif, supra note 1, 
at 2–4; Barbara von Tigerstrom, The Role of the Ombudsman in Protecting Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in 2 The International Ombudsman Yearbook, supra note 9, at 3, 4–8. 
13 See Reif, supra note 1, at 8. 
14 See e.g., id. at 7–11. Some Asian-Pacific and African states have given their ombuds-
man institutions anti-corruption or public official ethics enforcement mandates. See id. at 
10 (listing Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Macao (China), Taiwan, Indonesia, 
East Timor, South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, Mauritius, Lesotho, Seychelles, and Rwanda as 
examples). A few states have given their institutions numerous mandates. See id. at 9. For 
example, the ombudsmen in Namibia and Lesotho are responsible for human rights pro-
tection, anti-corruption, and environmental protection. See id. at 8–11. 
15 See id. at 9; see also History and Purpose of the Ombudsman’s Office, Ombudsman Mani-
toba, http://www.ombudsman.mb.ca/about.htm (last visited May 8, 2011) (freedom of 
information, privacy, and personal health information); New Brunswick Ombudsman, 
http://www.gnb.ca/0073/index-e.asp (last visited May 8, 2011) (freedom of information 
and privacy and service as Child and Youth Advocate); N.S.W. Ombudsman, http://www. 
ombo.nsw.gov.au/ (last visited May 8, 2011) (workplace child protection); Welcome to the Par-
liamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, Parliamentary & Health Service Ombudsman, 
http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/ (last visited May 8, 2011); What We Do, Yukon Ombudsman, 
http://www.ombudsman.yk.ca/ombudsman/ombwedo.html (last visited May 8, 2011) (free-
dom of information and privacy). 
16 See Reif, supra note 1, at 87–88. Human rights ombudsman institutions are also of-
ten given powers beyond those typically given to classical ombudsmen such as the powers 
to launch or intervene in constitutional court actions, prosecute public officials, and en-
gage in human rights research and education. See id. at 8, 88, 193. 
17 See id. at 11, 393. On a sub-national level, there are numerous human rights om-
budsman institutions, such as those in Spain and Argentina. See id. at 11. 
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tions are increasingly being transformed through the conferral of con-
stitutional or legislative mandates to protect human rights.18 
 This Article examines the proliferation of human rights ombuds-
man institutions over the past three decades and argues that their num-
bers will continue to grow relative to their classical predecessors. The 
forces responsible for the growth of human rights ombudsmen include 
democratization, public institution building, comparative law influ-
ences, limited state resources, international and regional movements to 
establish national human rights institutions (NHRIs), and the recent 
adoption of human rights treaties, along with other initiatives that rely 
on NHRIs, for domestic implementation of international human rights 
obligations.19 Although some mixed jurisdictions and a few common 
law states have adopted the human rights ombudsman model, they are 
primarily found in civil law jurisdictions.20 
                                                                                                                     
 Additionally, this Article reviews the core powers of human rights 
ombudsman institutions in various jurisdictions. Although a human 
rights ombudsman endowed with limited, classical powers may be effec-
tive, governments should endow their human rights ombudsmen with 
as many additional functions and powers as their institutional and legal 
systems permit to support the institution’s human rights mandate. Fi-
nally, all human rights ombudsmen should engage in appropriate insti-
tutional practices to maximize their ability to protect and promote hu-
man rights. 
 
18 See id. at 393. 
19 See id. at 8, 104–06, 393–94. See generally Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a 
Common Law Tradition, JuriGlobe, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/common- 
law.php (last visited May 8, 2011) (providing a list of common law and mixed systems world-
wide); Int’l Ombudsman Inst., Directory 2008, U. Alberta Fac. of L. (2008), http:// 
www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ioi/docs/Directory2008.pdf (listing contact information for 
ombudsman offices internationally). 
20 See Reif, supra note 1, at 8–9. These forces may also cause an increase in the number 
of human rights ombudsman institutions in common law jurisdictions. See id. at 8–9. See 
generally Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common Law Tradition, supra note 19 
(providing a list of common law and mixed systems worldwide); Directory 2008, supra note 
19 (listing contact information for ombudsman offices internationally). 
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I. The Historical Development and Current Use of Human 
Rights Ombudsman Institutions 
A. The Evolution of the Human Rights Ombudsman: The Classical 
Ombudsman and Human Rights Commissions 
 Since the 1960s, as government bureaucracies have grown in size, 
nations have steadily perceived the ombudsman as a useful mechanism 
for controlling administrative misconduct.21 Specifically, governments 
began adopting Scandinavia’s classical ombudsman model.22 Com-
monwealth countries in particular, many of which obtained their inde-
pendence following World War II, followed this trend.23 Western Euro-
pean nations, among others, caught up with this trend a few years later 
and began establishing classical ombudsman institutions in the 1970s.24 
 Born from the rubble of World War II, human rights commissions 
appeared as non-judicial mechanisms for protecting individuals from 
governments or private actors violating their rights.25 At first, only a few 
human rights commissions existed, primarily in European and Com-
monwealth states.26 Since the 1990s, however, many more have been 
created.27 Human rights commissions are multiple-member bodies with 
numerous human rights protection and promotion functions, including 
human rights research and education, advocating for the implementa-
tion of human rights treaties, and monitoring the state’s compliance 
with its international and domestic human rights obligations.28 While 
some commissions have a limited advisory or research role, many have 
investigatory powers and may recommend or conciliate resolutions to 
complaints; some may even refer complaints to tribunals or to courts for 
binding resolution, intervene in court actions, act as amici curiae, and 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Reif, supra note 1, at 6–7; Wade & Forsyth, supra note 10, at 73–75. 
22 See Reif, supra note 1, at 2. 
23 See id. at 6–7. In 1962, New Zealand became the first Commonwealth state to estab-
lish a classical ombudsman, followed by countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Asia and the 
Pacific region, the United Kingdom, and most Canadian provinces. See id. at 6 & n.30 (list-
ing countries that established a classical ombudsman chronologically by date). 
24 See id. at 6–7. For example, France’s Médiateur was copied by Francophone African 
states, Italian regions and provinces, Austria, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, a few U.S. 
states, most Canadian provinces and territories, and many Commonwealth Caribbean na-
tions. See id. at 6 & n.30, 7 & n.31, 11–12, 86–87. 
25 See id. at 6. 
26 See id. at 8–9, 83 n.8. 
27 Reif, supra note 1, at 83–85. 
28 Id. 
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conduct public inquiries.29 By the 1970s and 1980s, as the public con-
sciousness of the human rights abuses being committed by authoritarian 
or military dictatorships expanded, the number of international human 
rights laws increased.30 At the same time, democratization flourished, 
first in Southern Europe, then in Latin American as well as in Central 
and Eastern Europe.31 
 In these countries, public sector reform was on the agenda as 
framers built—or in some cases rebuilt—constitutional, legal, and insti-
tutional frameworks.32 Faced with the challenge of both ensuring ad-
ministrative justice and guarding against further human rights viola-
tions, many nations considered establishing horizontal accountability 
mechanisms in their new governments.33 To build this public architec-
ture, these new governments could draw on the existing models of om-
budsman institutions and human rights commissions.34 Nevertheless, 
rather than establishing separate accountability mechanisms, many of 
these nations created hybrid institutions reflecting each of the two insti-
tutional models.35 Although the contours of each human rights om-
                                                                                                                      
 
29 See id. at 85; see also Anna-Elina Pohjolainen, The Danish Inst. for Human Rights, 
The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions—The Role of the United 
Nations 16–20 (2006). See generally The Protection Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions (Bertrand G. Ramcharan ed., 2005) (discussing the protection roles of the 
human rights commissions in Australia, Denmark, Fiji, Ghana, India, Mexico, Nepal, North-
ern Ireland, Philippines, and Uganda). 
30 See Reif, supra note 1, at 128–33, 393–95; e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of 
San José, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
31 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twen-
tieth Century 21–26 (1991). This development has been uneven and, as a result, some na-
tions have experienced setbacks. See John Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America 
26–28, 182–83 (3d ed. 2009). 
32 See Huntington, supra note 31, at 21–25. 
33 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in The Self-
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies 29, 43 (Andreas 
Schedler et al. eds., 1999). 
34 See Reif, supra note 1, at 393–95. 
35 See id. at 8–9. While the generic term “human rights ombudsman” will be used, the 
actual titles given to these hybrids vary, including “commissioner for civil rights protec-
tion,” “defender of the people,” “attorney for the defense of human rights,” and “om-
budsman.” See id. at 12. For example, Poland uses the “commissioner for civil rights protec-
tion” designation. Id. “Defender of the people” is used in Spain and parts of Latin Amer-
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budsman vary, nearly all are single office-holders and the institution 
always has the power to investigate public complaints, make recom-
mendations, and report its findings.36 
 The distinguishing characteristics of these institutions are their 
specific mandates with respect to human rights.37 Many mix adminis-
trative justice duties with responsibilities for protecting and promoting 
human rights; nevertheless, there can be considerable differences in 
emphasis depending on an institution’s particular constitutional or leg-
islative mandate and its unique political and economic context.38 Some 
single office-holder institutions have mandates similar to those of a 
human rights commission, which focuses on the protection and pro-
motion of human rights and lacks an express ability to oversee adminis-
trative justice.39 While a few institutions have only investigation, report-
ing, and recommendation functions, many have stronger powers like 
the right to inspect closed facilities, to bring abstract or concrete review 
actions before constitutional courts, to participate in administrative 
court proceedings, or to prosecute or recommend the prosecution of 
public officials.40 Furthermore, some human rights ombudsman insti-
tutions have jurisdiction over aspects of private sector conduct in addi-
tion to public sector jurisdiction.41 
                                                                                                                     
 As they transitioned to democracy in the mid-1970s, Portugal and 
Spain became the first countries to establish human rights ombuds-
men.42 In 1975, Portugal established the Provedor de Justiça.43 Spain en-
shrined its Defensor del Pueblo in the country’s 1978 Constitution as well 
as in a legislative enactment.44 The Spanish institution was tasked with 
defending constitutional human rights guarantees by supervising gov-
ernment administration; additional legislation added an ombudsman-
 
ica. Id. Variations of “attorney for the defense of human rights” can be found in Central 
America. Id. Namibia and Greece are examples of countries that use the term “ombuds-
man.” Id. Several hybrids use the commission format such as Ghana’s Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice and Tanzania’s Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance. Id. 
36 See Pohjolainen, supra note 29, at 18–19; von Tigerstrom, supra note 12, at 4–8. 
37 von Tigerstrom, supra note 12, at 7–8. 
38 See id. 
39 See Pohjolainen, supra note 29, at 18–19. In practice, however, some of these hu-
man rights ombudsmen may nevertheless investigate administrative complaints. See id. 
40 See infra Part III.B. 
41 See Pohjolainen, supra note 29, at 17. 
42 See Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Insti-
tutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1, 36 (2000). 
43 See Reif, supra note 1, at 8, 141–42. The institution was elevated to a constitutional 
office in 1976. See id. at 141. 
44 Id. at 8. 
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like element to the mix.45 Beyond the powers to investigate, recom-
mend, and report, both the Portuguese and Spanish institutions could 
bring actions before their respective constitutional courts.46 
 In Sweden, legislation passed in 1986 established an express, albeit 
more subtle, duty for the ombudsman to protect human rights: “The 
Ombudsmen are to ensure in particular . . . that the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of citizens are not encroached upon in public admini-
stration.”47 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc and 
their turn toward democracy in the late 1980s, similar desires both to 
improve bureaucratic performance and halt human rights abuses by 
the government led many Central and Eastern European governments 
to establish human rights ombudsman institutions.48 Hybrid institu-
tions also began to appear in some African, Asian, Caribbean, Pacific, 
and Western European nations.49 
                                                                                                                     
B. Mapping the Human Rights Ombudsman and Classical  
Ombudsman Institutions 
 Today, the human rights ombudsman is an institution found in 
many nations around the world. Most Latin American countries have a 
 
45 See Constitutión Española, B.O.E. n. 54, Dec. 29, 1978; Ley Organica del Defen-
sor del Pueblo (B.O.E. 1981, 10325); see also Reif, supra note 1, at 145–49; Ascensión Elvira 
Perales, Implementing the Spanish Constitution, in Constitutional Policy and Change in 
Europe 214, 220 ( Joachim Jens Hesse & Nevil Johnson eds., 1995). 
46 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 354–55; Reif, supra note 
1, at 147–49. 
47 See 3 § Lag med instruktion för Riksdagens ombudsmän (1986:765); Summary of 
the Committee’s Proposals, in JO: Ämbetet En översyn: Betänkande avgivet av 1983 års 
JO-utredning tillsatt av riksdagen SOU 1986:26 [Report Delivered By the 1983 Om-
budsman’s Office Inquiry Appointed By the Parliament SOU 1986:26] 281, 281–82 (1985); 
Claes Eklundh, The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman System, in Human Rights Commis-
sions and Ombudsman Offices: National Experiences Throughout the World 423, 
425 (Kamal Hossain et al. eds., 2000); see also Stig Jägerskiöld, The Swedish Ombudsman, 109 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1077, 1097–98 (1961) (describing the contribution of Swedish ombudsmen 
to civil liberties since the late nineteenth century). Sweden’s Instrument of Government 
(Constitution) states, “The Riksdag elects one or more Parliamentary Ombudsmen to 
supervise the application of laws and other statutes in the public service, under terms of 
reference drawn up by the Riksdag.” Regeringsformen [RF] [Constitution] 12:6. A for-
mer Swedish Ombudsman noted that this legislative provision refers to the human rights 
guarantees contained in the Swedish constitution. See Eklundh, supra, at 425 (adding that 
Sweden had recently implemented the European Convention on Human Rights into the 
Swedish domestic law system). 
48 See Reif, supra note 1, at 8, 155–60. 
49 See id. at 125, 171, 215. 
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national human rights ombudsman.50 For example, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela all have human 
rights ombudsmen.51 In the broader Caribbean region, the ombudsmen 
of Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Haiti all have human rights mandates to 
differing degrees.52 Additionally, human rights ombudsmen or commis-
sioners are found widely throughout Central and Eastern Europe.53 
While many of these institutions have dual human rights and adminis-
trative justice functions, a few focus exclusively on protecting human 
rights.54 Increasingly, some ombudsman institutions in other European 
                                                                                                                      
 
50 See id. at 188. Exceptions include Mexico (which uses the human rights commission 
model), Uruguay, and Chile. See id. at 190–91; see also Institución Nacional de Derechos Hu-
manos, Ley No. 18.446 (2009) (Uruguay), available at http://www.undp.org/uy/showNews. 
asp?NewsID=695 (follow “Texto del Ley” hyperlink); Linda C. Reif, The Promotion of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law by the Office of the Ombudsman, in The International Ombudsman 
Anthology: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, 
supra note 10, at 271, 296. Chile also recently established a national human rights institu-
tion. See Institucionalidad de Derechos Humanos en Chile, in Informe Anual Sobre Derechos 
Humanos en Chile 2010, at 449, 449 ( Jorge Contesse Singh ed., 2010), available at http:// 
www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl/informe-anual-sobre-derechos-humanos-en-chile-2010/. 
51 See Directories of Ombudsman Offices: Ombudsman of Latin America, Inter-Am. Inst. of 
Hum. Rts., http://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/ombudsnet/english/f_O_LA.htm (last 
visited May 8, 2011). In Latin America, an ombudsman is commonly called Defensor del 
Pueblo (“Defender of the People”), but may also be referred to as Defensor de los Habitantes 
(“Defender of the Inhabitants”), Comisionado de los Derechos Humanos (“Commissioner of 
Human Rights”), or Procurador de los Derechos Humanos (“Attorney for Human Rights”). See 
id.; see also Leo Valladares Lanza, The Challenges Facing the Ombudsman in Latin America, in 2 
The International Ombudsman Yearbook, supra note 9, at 159, 159–60. 
52 See Reif, supra note 1, at 171 n.3. In 2011, the Dominican Republic made a com-
mitment to appoint a Defensor del Pueblo, ten years after the adoption of a statute to create a 
Defensor in 2001. See id. at 115; Public Statement, Amnesty Int’l, Dominican Republic: Hu-
man Rights Council Adopts Universal Periodic Review Outcome on Dominican Republic: 
Amnesty International Welcomes Commitment to Strengthen Action to Combat Violence 
Against Women and Encourages the Government to Enhance Investigation of Violations 
Committed By Security Forces (Mar. 17, 2011), available at https://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/library/asset/AMR27/001/2010/en/cd5a548f-cf56-4d42-8692-1eddc0dcb8e3/amr270 
012010en.html. 
53 See id. at 157–60; see also European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 503. 
Countries with human rights ombudsman institutions include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Ka-
zakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. See 
Reif, supra note 1, at 157–60; see also European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 
503. See generally Directory 2008, supra note 19 (listing contact information for ombudsman 
offices internationally). In Estonia, the Legal Chancellor is responsible for protecting human 
rights. See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 6, 51. 
54 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 502. For example, insti-
tutions in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan use only human 
rights standards in investigations. See id. The institutions in Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, 
278 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:269 
regions have taken on human rights-related functions either at their 
inception or through legal reform.55 France’s 2008 constitutional re-
forms provided for a new human rights state institution, the Défenseur des 
Droits.56 In Australia, the ombudsman of the State of Victoria handles 
complaints with respect to alleged breaches of the State’s Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities by public authorities.57 Further, 
Denmark and Luxembourg have given their classical ombudsman insti-
tutions human rights monitoring responsibilities under the Optional 
Protocol to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.58 
 African nations with human rights ombudsman institutions in-
clude Angola, Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, and Sey-
                                                                                                                      
and Venezuela have dual mandates, while others in Latin America are focused predomi-
nantly on human rights. See Reif, supra note 1, at 187–91, 188 n.116, 190 n.125, 197, 201. 
55 See Reif, supra note 1, at 137–69 (surveying the ombudsman’s institutional develop-
ment in various European countries). Human rights ombudsmen are also found in Spain, 
Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Greece, Andorra, and Cyprus. See European Om-
budsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 502. Finland’s ombudsman was given an addi-
tional human rights mandate in 1995, which entered into force in 1999. See Ulla-Maija 
Lindström, Compensation for Violations of Fundamental Rights—Decisions and Opinions by the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, in Parliamentary Ombudsman: 90 Years 77, 79 (Greg Coogan 
& Arttu Tolonen trans., 2010), available at http://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource.phx/ 
eoa/english/publications/jubilee-book.htx; Pasi Pölönen, Monitoring Fundamental and 
Human Rights as the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Duty, in Parliamentary Ombudsman: 90 
Years, supra, at 51, 54. In 2007, Norway’s ombudsman was given a dual ombudsman-
human rights mandate in amendments to the institution’s legislation. See Arne Fliflet, Par-
liamentary Ombudsman of Norway Annual Report 2007: Summary in English, Sivilombuds-
mannen, 13–14 (May 2008), http://www.sivilombudsmannen.no/getfile.php/Filer/%C3% 
85rsmelding/kortmelding%20ENGELSK.pdf. A majority of Spain’s autonomous commu-
nities also established their own human rights ombudsman institutions, albeit without the 
power to bring actions before the constitutional court. See Reif, supra note 1, at 149–51. 
These communities include Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, the Basque region, the Canary 
Islands, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarra, and the Valen-
cian Community. See id. at 150. Sub-national hybrids also exist in some other European 
states. See id. at 126. 
56 See 1958 Const. 71-1, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/English/8ab. 
asp (last visited May 8, 2011) (English translation). Article 71-1 states that “[t]he Defender 
of Rights shall ensure the due respect of rights and freedoms by state administrations, 
territorial communities, public legal entities, as well as by all bodies carrying out a public 
service mission” by taking complaints from persons contending that their rights have been 
infringed. See id. 
57 See G.E. Brouwer, Ombudsman Victoria Annual Report 2007–08, Ombudsman Victo-
ria, 31 (Sept. 2008), http://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/resources/documents/Annual_ 
Report_07-08_1.9mb1.pdf (stating that human rights responsibilities commenced January 
1, 2008). 
58 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 159, 295. 
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chelles.59 Human rights ombudsmen are far less common in Asia and 
the Pacific regions, but East Timor, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea are ex-
amples of states that have institutions with human rights mandates of 
varying scope.60 
 In sum, while human rights ombudsmen are found in most 
global regions, they are predominantly established in Latin America 
and in Central and Eastern Europe.61 While many countries choose to 
have one unified human rights overseer, a human rights ombudsman 
sometimes exists alongside another, general-purpose human rights 
institution, often a research or advisory human rights commission.62 
Most of the jurisdictions with human rights ombudsman institutions 
are civil law systems, although the ombudsman is present in some 
common law or mixed legal systems.63 Furthermore, those civil law 
countries with a constitutional court may have a more powerful hu-
man rights ombudsman.64 The quantity and quality of powers given to 
                                                                                                                      
 
59 See Reif, supra note 1, at 220–22, 224; Angola: Office of the Ombudsman, Electoral 
Inst. for the Sustainability of Democracy in Afr., http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/ang 
agency.htm (last visited May 8, 2011); Message from the Chief Ombudsman, Ethiopian Insti-
tution Ombudsman, http://www.ethombudsman.gov.et/ (last visited May 8, 2011). The 
institutions in Ghana and Tanzania have multiple mandates and a commission format. See 
Reif, supra note 1, at 224. 
60 See Reif, supra note 1, at 245, 249. 
61 See id. at 9. 
62 See Sonia Cardenas, Adaptive States: The Proliferation of National Human Rights Institutions 
11 (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy, Working Paper No. T-01-04), available at http:// 
www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Cardenas.pdf. Greece and Nor-
way are examples of countries that have a human rights ombudsman and another general 
purpose human rights institution. See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, 
at 220, 336. 
63 See generally Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common Law Tradition, supra 
note 19 (providing a list of common law and mixed systems worldwide); Directory 2008, 
supra note 19 (listing contact information for ombudsman offices internationally). Exam-
ples of states with common law systems using human rights ombudsmen include Jamaica, 
Victoria (Australia), and Belize. See Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common 
Law Tradition, supra note 19; Directory 2008, supra note 19, at 7–9, 12, 34. Mixed systems 
with human rights ombudsmen are found in Malawi and Papua New Guinea. See Common 
Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common Law Tradition, supra note 19; Directory 2008, 
supra note 19, at 37, 51. Lesotho, Gambia, Seychelles, and Namibia have mixed systems 
with hybrid institutions. See Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common Law Tradi-
tion, supra note 19; Directory 2008, supra note 19, at 22, 35, 46, 54; see also Reif, supra note 1, 
at 9, 11. 
64 See Reif, supra note 1, at 252. Many civil law states with constitutional courts have es-
tablished human rights ombudsmen who are typically authorized to launch actions in con-
stitutional courts. See id. at 9, 11. See generally Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a 
Common Law Tradition, supra note 19 (providing a list of common law and mixed systems 
worldwide); Constitutional Courts (Links), Council Eur. Venice Commission, http://www. 
venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_court_links_ef.asp (last visited May 8, 2011) (providing 
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human rights ombudsmen in countries without constitutional courts 
varies.65 
 On the contrary, the classical ombudsman is now found predomi-
nantly in North America, Commonwealth Caribbean nations and over-
seas territories, parts of Western Europe, and in a number of African, 
Asian, and Pacific states.66 Some of the jurisdictions with classical om-
budsmen, particularly Commonwealth nations, also have separate hu-
man rights commissions.67 Thus, classical ombudsman institutions are 
found across common law, civil law, and mixed legal systems.68 
 The concept of a modern human rights ombudsman is not alien 
to or irreconcilable with the classical ombudsman model. A testament 
to the compatibility of these two concepts is the substantial number of 
human rights ombudsman institutions that have been established and 
maintained since the 1970s using the ombudsman model.69 At its core, 
the ombudsman is an institution designed to monitor illegality, unfair-
ness, and injustice in public administration.70 In this sense, breaches of 
human rights laws, whether domestic or international obligations, have 
                                                                                                                      
website information for constitutional courts and equivalent bodies worldwide); Directory 
2008, supra note 19 (listing contact information for ombudsman offices internationally). 
On the contrary, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Argentina are civil law systems 
without constitutional courts that have human rights ombudsmen. See Reif, supra note 1, at 
9, 11; Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common Law Tradition, supra note 19; 
Constitutional Courts (Links), supra note 19; Directory 2008, supra note 19, at 2–7, 19, 21–22, 
49, 59; The Supreme Court, Högsta Domstolen, http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/Funk 
tioner/English/The-Swedish-courts/The-Supreme-Court/ (last visited May 8, 2011) (provid-
ing information about the Swedish Supreme Court). 
65 See Constitutional Courts (Links), supra note 64. See generally Reif, supra note 1, at 13–
15, 137–41 (outlining the powers of the legislative ombudsmen of Scandinavian countries 
without constitutional courts). For example, Argentina’s Defensor del Pueblo can launch 
amparo court actions, while the human rights ombudsman institutions in Sweden and 
Finland can prosecute public officials, but do not have the mandate to launch constitu-
tional human rights court actions. See Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Constitutional Pro-
tection of Human Rights in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Amparo Pro-
ceedings 77 (2009); Reif, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
66 See generally Directory 2008, supra note 19 (listing contact information for ombuds-
man offices internationally). 
67 See Reif, supra note 1, at 102. 
68 See generally Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common Law Tradition, supra 
note 19 (providing a list of common law and mixed systems worldwide); Directory 2008, 
supra note 19 (listing contact information for ombudsman offices internationally). Saint 
Lucia, Quebec, Malta, Botswana, and Pakistan are examples of countries with mixed sys-
tems and a classical ombudsman. See Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common 
Law Tradition, supra note 19; Directory 2008, supra note 19, at 13, 17, 38, 49–50, 53. 
69 See Reif, supra note 1, at 6 n.30. 
70 See Marten Oosting, The Ombudsman and His Environment: A Global View, in The In-
ternational Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the International 
Ombudsman Institute, supra note 10, at 1, 1. 
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always been part of the ombudsman’s mission. It has long been recog-
nized that even the classical ombudsman plays a role both in human 
rights protection and in the implementation of a state’s domestic and 
international human rights obligations.71 Thus, one way of looking at 
the human rights ombudsman is as a workable adaptation of the classi-
cal ombudsman concept. 
II. Forces Compelling the Growth of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman Phenomenon 
 A variety of forces, both legal and non-legal, have compelled the 
growth of human rights ombudsman institutions around the world, 
both in absolute terms and relative to the number of classical ombuds-
man institutions.72 These forces include democratization and public 
institution-building initiatives; comparative law influences in particular 
regions or sub-regions; the need to conserve government resources; in-
ternational initiatives to establish NHRIs; and pressure resulting from 
regional standards, U.N. standards, and treaty initiatives to establish 
domestic institutions for human rights protection.73 It is likely that these 
forces will continue to influence governments to establish some form of 
human rights ombudsman. These same forces have led other states to 
establish human rights commissions.74 While common law jurisdictions 
tended to create separate, classical ombudsman institutions and human 
rights commissions, these forces may also induce common law states to 
establish human rights ombudsman institutions.75 
A. Democratization, Public Institution-Building, and the Influence of 
Comparative Law 
 Beginning in the 1970s, as a number of European and Latin 
American countries transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democ-
                                                                                                                      
71 See Reif, supra note 1, at 3; Ann Abraham, Commentary, The Future in International 
Perspective: The Ombudsman as Agent of Rights, Justice and Democracy, 61 Parliamentary Aff. 
681, 684–85, 690 (2008); Gerald E. Caiden et al., The Institution of Ombudsman, in Interna-
tional Handbook of the Ombudsman: Evolution and Present Function 3, 5 (Gerald 
E. Caiden ed., 1983); Bernard Frank, The Ombudsman and Human Rights—Revisited, in 6 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 122, 139 (1976). 
72 See Reif, supra note 1, at 6. 
73 See Reif, supra note 50, at 275. 
74 See Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 10, at 18, 94. 
75 See id. at 18–19; European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 502. See gen-
erally Common Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Common Law Tradition, supra note 19 
(providing a list of common law and mixed systems worldwide); Directory 2008, supra note 
19 (listing contact information for ombudsman offices internationally). 
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racies, they sought to rebuild their public institutions with checks to 
avoid the human rights abuses and bureaucratic ineptitude of the prior 
regimes.76 These countries saw methods of horizontal accountability in 
public institutions, including human rights commissions and the om-
budsman, as important models for their own use.77 
 Thomas Pegram has explored the diffusion of NHRIs, including 
the human rights ombudsman, around the world.78 He argues that the 
mechanisms of diffusion by acculturation and persuasion have led to 
the spread of NHRIs and that the acculturation process has resulted in 
a “general conformity, or isomorphism, across models within regional 
referent groups.”79 With democratic transitions occurring throughout 
some regions in a relatively short period of time and the associated 
need for new institutional models, the acculturation process can help 
to explain the spread of the human rights ombudsman institution 
throughout Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe.80 As 
argued below, however, U.N.-level pressure to create human rights om-
budsman institutions was weak in the early 1990s, so the acculturation 
process would likely have been spurred on in that period predomi-
nantly by regional organizational and institutional influences.81 
 Pegram also concludes that the human rights ombudsman and 
human rights commission models are found most often in countries 
with hybrid or “partly free” democratic regimes, while “the classical om-
budsman continues to predominate in ‘free’ regimes, increasingly oper-
ating in conjunction with a human rights commission model.”82 This 
may be due in part to the novelty and related allure of the human rights 
ombudsman model in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which coincides 
with the period of democratic transition for several countries in Latin 
America and in Central and Eastern Europe.83 
 More recently, however, an increasing number of “fully free,” de-
mocratic nations have adopted the human rights ombudsman model, 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Oosting, supra note 70, at 4. 
77 See Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 10, at 18. 
78 See Thomas Pegram, Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National 
Human Rights Institutions, 32 Hum. Rts. Q. 729, 729 (2010). 
79 Id. at 749. 
80 See id. at 760. 
81 See Reif, supra note 1, at 258–87 (discussing U.N. involvement in post-conflict peace-
building processes that established human rights ombudsman institutions). 
82 Pegram, supra note 78, at 755. 
83 See id. at 748–49. 
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mainly in Western and Southern Europe.84 This development may be 
traceable to the diffusion process. Moreover, it is likely that regional 
influences have played an important role. The growth of human rights 
ombudsman institutions in these states—including those that have 
transitioned from a classical to a human rights ombudsman model— 
along with the presence of classical, or anti-corruption, ombudsman 
institutions in states at varying points along the political spectrum, will 
likely increase the proportion of human rights ombudsman institutions 
in the free or partly free sector of the political spectrum.85 This ten-
dency will become more pronounced if the classical ombudsman insti-
tutions in free states with monitoring responsibilities pursuant to the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) are reclas-
sified as human rights ombudsman institutions.86 
 Comparative law influences are also instructive as a distinct force 
in the human rights ombudsman evolution. In particular, the legal 
transplant and adaptation concepts are useful in understanding the 
institution’s development.87 The diffusion by acculturation process 
posed by Pegram collapses comparative law aspects of the process into 
the broader theory of diffusion.88 As noted above, most countries with 
human rights ombudsman institutions—and all countries with such 
institutions in Europe and Latin America—have civil law systems, so the 
transplantation of the human rights ombudsman has been predomi-
nantly into other civil law systems.89 As discussed below, in many cases 
lawyer elites, government officials, and civil society groups regard the 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Reif, supra note 1, at 83. A majority of these states are European Union mem-
bers. See id. at 137, 141, 368. 
85 See id. at 84; Pegram, supra note 78, at 755. 
86 See Reif, supra note 1, at 84. 
87 See Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, supra note 11, at 441, 465. For back-
ground on legal transplant concepts, see generally Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: 
An Approach to Comparative Law (2d ed. 1993); Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant 
Effect, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 163 (2003); William Ewald, Comparative Justice (II): The Logic of 
Legal Transplants, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 489 (1995); Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal 
Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant 
Process, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 839 (2003); David Nelken, The Meaning of Success in Transnational 
Legal Transfers, 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 349 (2001). But see generally Pierre Legrand, 
The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants,’ 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 111 (1997) (argu-
ing that legal transplants, as described by proponents of the theory, cannot occur across 
jurisdictions because the meaning and significance of law is specific to the community that 
interprets it). 
88 See Pegram, supra note 78, at 747–50. 
89 See Reif, supra note 1, at 2, 8–9. 
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ombudsman concept, whether in its original or adapted form, as a 
prestigious or superior model.90 
 Adaptation or hybridization, the next step in the evolution of the 
ombudsman, first occurred on the Iberian Peninsula.91 Reacting to the 
immediate political past, the newly democratic governments of Spain 
and Portugal modified the classic ombudsman model by adding a 
mandate that the ombudsman protect human rights.92 In other words, 
they adapted the legal transplant of the Scandinavian model by adding 
an express duty to protect human rights.93 As Buades stated with re-
spect to the establishment of Spain’s Defensor del Pueblo, 
[W]hen shaping the figure of the Ombudsman, Spanish con-
stitutionalists had the characteristics of the Scandinavian 
model very much in mind in terms of independence, parlia-
mentary links and control of the administration, in order to 
avoid abuses and errors in the omnipresent public administra-
tion . . . . With the intention of consolidating and strengthen-
ing the recently conquered freedoms, a further step was taken 
by entrusting the Ombudsman with the task of defending 
fundamental rights . . . .94 
The Spanish legal heritage of Latin America made the Spanish Defensor 
del Pueblo an attractive legal transplant for Latin American countries 
transitioning to democracy.95 Spain and Latin America have civil law 
                                                                                                                      
90 See Graziadei, supra note 87, at 457–58. In both Latin America and Europe, many of 
the legal experts and drafters involved in the process appear to have been familiar with the 
Scandinavian ombudsman concept and the Iberian hybrid human rights ombudsman. See 
Reif, supra note 1, at 8–9, 25. Where post-conflict peace-building agreements establish a 
human rights ombudsman, the particular ombudsman model chosen for the transitioning 
jurisdiction will likely have been influenced by the preferences of the international organi-
zation personnel of diverse nationalities involved in the drafting process. See id. at 284–87. 
91 See Reif, supra note 1, at 8. 
92 See id. at 141, 146. 
93 See id. 
94 Margarita Retuerto Buades, The Internationalization of Human Rights; Constitution and 
Ombudsman in Spain, in Ombudsman and Human Rights: Proceedings of a Symposium 
37, 42 (Nat’l Ombudsman of the Neth. ed., 1995). 
95 See Reif, supra note 1, at 188. Brazil, however, has a Portuguese legal heritage. See id. 
at 191 (indicating that Brazil has ombudsman institutions in some states and municipali-
ties); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Development of Comparative Law in Latin America, in The Ox-
ford Handbook of Comparative Law, supra note 11, at 261, 266–67, 276–78; see also 
Aspásia Camargo, Federalism and National Identity, in Brazil: A Century of Change 216, 
247–49 (Ignacy Sachs et al. eds., 2009) (noting that Brazil’s 1988 Constitution “recovered 
very old traditions of Portuguese municipalism” which led to “the strengthening of the 
power and legitimacy of local governments”). 
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legal systems.96 In its 1978 Constitution, Spain established a constitu-
tional court outside the judicial branch for the adjudication of constitu-
tional matters—including human rights—and adopted the amparo ac-
tion, whereby persons can use litigation to protect their human 
rights.97 Most Latin American nations also have constitutional courts 
and the amparo or equivalent actions.98 Accordingly, the Spanish ver-
sion of the human rights ombudsman, and its integral relationship with 
a constitutional court and the amparo action, was seen to be a natural fit 
for many Latin American states.99 
                                                                                                                     
 Guatemala was the first Latin American state to establish a human 
rights accountability institution, with its Procurador de los Derechos Hu-
manos.100 One early Procurador who helped formulate Guatemala’s con-
stitution in 1985 described both the Swedish ombudsman and Spanish 
Defensor del Pueblo as the institutions that inspired the Guatemalan Pro-
curador’s legal framework.101 Following Guatemala’s lead, in the early 
1990s a number of other Latin American states created Defensor del 
Pueblo, Procurador, and human rights commissioner institutions with 
varying emphasis on human rights protection and promotion.102 For 
example, Argentina and Peru followed the Spanish Defensor del Pueblo 
 
96 See M.C. Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and Institu-
tions in Spanish America 15, 45–47, 51–52, 104 (2004). Indeed, Spanish law was applied 
in the latter territories during the colonial period until local laws were developed, and 
Spanish law and doctrine remained influential in Latin America. See id. at 15. 
97 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 401. Curiously, while the 
amparo action originated in nineteenth-century Latin America, Spain did not adopt the 
action until the twentieth century. See Brewer-Carías, supra note 65, at 1, 4–6, 73–76. 
98 See Brewer-Carías, supra note 65, at 163; Mirow, supra note 96, at 178, 180. 
99 See, e.g., Lorena González Volio, The Institution of the Ombudsman: The Latin American 
Experience, 37 Revista IIDH 219, 223 (2003). Mexico, however, has a civil law system and 
the amparo action, but does not have a constitutional court and has adopted the human 
rights commission model. See Mirow, supra note 96, at 173, 178. 
100 See Reif, supra note 1, at 172, 188. The phrase Procurador de los Derechos Humanos 
translates into English as “Attorney for Human Rights.” Ramiro de León Carpio, The Om-
budsman in Guatemala, in International Congress: “The Experience of the Ombuds-
man Today” 113, 115 (Nat’l Comm’n for Human Rights ed., José de Garay y Cuevas trans., 
1992). 
101 See de León Carpio, supra note 100, at 115; see also Antecedentes, Procuraduría de 
los Derechos Humanos, 1 ( July 27, 2010), http://www.pdh.org.gt/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=25&Itemid=9 (follow hyperlink to pdf 
document under “Antecedentes” heading). Members of the Guatemalan College of Lawyers 
and Notaries met informally in the lead-up to the elections for the constitutional assembly 
and came up with ideas that included the Procurador model; in turn, some of these legal 
experts were elected to the constitutional assembly and lobbied successfully for the inclu-
sion of the Procurador institution in Guatemala’s new constitution. See de León Carpio, 
supra note 100, at 113–14. 
102 See Reif, supra note 1, at 172, 187–91. 
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model by establishing clearly defined human rights and administrative 
justice mandates; the Swedish ombudsman institution provided more 
general inspiration.103 
 In the late 1980s, as communist regimes imploded, Central and 
Eastern European nations began the process of nation-building.104 
Western European, U.S., and indigenous models all influenced the 
shape and substance of their new constitutions and public institu-
tions.105 Many adopted variants of the human rights ombudsman, albeit 
with differing powers and names. Poland was the first nation in the re-
gion to establish a human rights ombudsman.106 Polish law scholars 
and organized civil society first discussed creating an ombudsman insti-
tution in the early 1980s.107 Poland’s communist regime actually cre-
ated the country’s Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection in 1987 
prior to its collapse; it was “apparently conjured up by high state offi-
cials to prove that reforms undertaken by the communist government 
were not merely empty words.”108 The Commissioner was established to 
safeguard citizens’ rights and freedoms found in the constitution and 
other normative acts infringed upon by public authorities.109 Addition-
                                                                                                                      
103 See id. at 8–9, 188–91; Thomas Pegram, Accountability in Hostile Times: The Case of the 
Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman 1996–2001, 40 J. Latin Am. Stud. 51, 55 (2008); Jorge 
Santistevan de Noriega, La Defensoría del Pueblo en el Perú: Reflexiones Correspondientes a sus 
Dos Primeros Años, in Debate Defensorial: Revista de la Defensoría del Pueblo 77, 77 
( Jorge Santistevan de Noriega ed., 1998); Thomas Pegram, D.Phil. Candidate in Politics, 
Nuttfield Coll., Univ. of Oxford, Paper Presented at the Society of Latin American Studies 
Annual Conference: The Peruvian Ombudsman: The Last Bastion of Universality? 3 (Apr. 
13–15, 2007). 
104 See Iván Bizjak, The Role and Experience of an Ombudsman in a New Democracy, in 2 The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook, supra note 9, at 57, 57–58. 
105 See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central European Democ-
racies, 29 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 10 (2000); Rett R. Ludwikowski, “Mixed” Constitutions—
Product of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. Int’l L.J. 1, 50–63 
(1998); Victoria Schwartz, The Influences of the West on the 1993 Russian Constitution, 32 
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 101, 110–13 (2009). 
106 See Reif, supra note 1, at 160. 
107 See Agnieszka Klich, Human Rights in Poland: The Role of the Constitutional Tribunal 
and the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights, 1996 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L.J. 33, 38; 
Ewa Letowska, The Polish Ombudsman: (The Commissioner for the Protection of Civil Rights), 39 
Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 206, 206 (1990); see also Mark F. Brzezinski, The Emergence of Judicial 
Review in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 41 Am. J. Comp. L. 153, 173–76 (1993) (discuss-
ing the establishment of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal between 1981 and 1985). 
108 Klich, supra note 107, at 38. 
109 See The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Apr. 2, 1997, ch. II, art. 80; id. 
ch. IX, art. 208; see also European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 345–47; 
Marek Zubik, Poland’s Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection: Two Decades of Human and Civil 
Rights Protection, in 10 The International Ombudsman Yearbook 182, 183–84 (Linda C. 
Reif ed., 2006). 
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ally, it had the power to bring actions before Poland’s constitutional 
court and its administrative courts.110 The first Polish Commissioner 
stated, “Poland’s ombudsman’s office is modeled after the Scandina-
vian version which was vigorously promoted by Polish scholars ac-
quainted with West European institutions. Communist officials, largely 
ignorant of the nature of this institution, agreed to establish [the] om-
budsman without realizing the potential consequences.”111 One publi-
cist stated that the Polish institution was also modeled on the classical 
ombudsman offices in France and the United Kingdom.112 
                                                                                                                     
 In Hungary, a legislative proposal for an ombudsman was first put 
forth in 1988.113 It appears that the Swedish and Polish models were 
influential in the subsequent development of the Hungarian commis-
sioners for human rights.114 The Slovenian Human Rights Ombuds-
man legislation was passed in late 1993 and “modelled the duties and 
authorities of the ombudsman on a classical Scandinavian type of om-
budsman, combining it with some provisions of the legislation in those 
European countries, which recently established such institutions (e.g. 
Netherlands, Spain).”115 The drafters of federal constitutional law on 
the commissioner for human rights in Russia also looked to the om-
budsman institutions of Sweden and Great Britain.116 The Russians 
were particularly influenced by ombudsman institutions in countries 
that had experienced or were experiencing a political transition; there-
fore “[s]pecial attention was paid to the experience of Poland, Slove-
nia, and post-Franco Spain,” although the Russian model was adapted 
to fit its own particular environment.117 
 Thus, Central and Eastern European nations looked not only to 
classical ombudsman institutions for inspiration but also to hybrid mod-
 
110 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 345–47, 521. 
111 See Ewa Letowska, The Ombudsman and Basic Rights, 4 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 63, 63 
(1995); see also Ewa Letowska, The Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights in Central and Eastern 
Europe: The Polish Experience, 1996 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L.J. 1, 2. 
112 See Howard Elcock, The Polish Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights Protection: Decaying Com-
munism to Pluralist Democracy Through an Ombudsman’s Eyes, 75 Pub. Admin. 359, 363 (1997). 
113 See László Majtényi, On the History of Adopting the Institution of Ombudsman in Hun-
gary, 1 J. Const. L. E. & Cent. Eur. 163, 169 (1994). 
114 See id. at 167–69. 
115 Ivan Bizjak, The Human Rights Ombudsman of Slovenia, in Human Rights Commis-
sions and Ombudsman Offices: National Experiences Throughout the World, su-
pra note 47, at 373, 373. 
116 See Emma Gilligan, The Human Rights Ombudsman in Russia: The Evolution of Horizon-
tal Accountability, 32 Hum. Rts. Q. 575, 582 & n.30 (2010). 
117 Bill Bowring, Sergei Kovalyov: The First Russian Human Rights Ombudsman—and the 
Last?, in Constitutional Reform and International Law in Central and Eastern 
Europe 235, 240 (Rein Müllerson et al. eds., 1998). 
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els like the Spanish Defensor del Pueblo and the Polish Commissioner for 
Civil Rights Protection.118 Unlike the Swedish ombudsman, both the 
Defensor del Pueblo and the Polish Commissioner had the power to bring 
human rights-related actions in a constitutional court, a power subse-
quently included in other human rights ombudsman institutional struc-
tures in Eastern and Central Europe.119 On the other hand, Scandina-
vian models—in particular the Swedish variant—along with the Defensor 
del Pueblo, were more influential in Latin America.120 In both regions, 
however, adopting a human rights ombudsman model was not the end 
of the story: the structures of subsequent institutions were also shaped 
by other early intra-regional institutions in jurisdictions with political 
and legal environments similar to those of the copying state.121 
 Tracing the influence of comparative law on human rights om-
budsmen created in other parts of the world is more difficult. Colonial 
legal histories likely play a role. For example, East Timor’s past colonial 
legal ties to the Portuguese Provedor de Justiça model helped shape its 
own human rights ombudsman, which was enshrined in the nation’s 
2002 independence constitution and was given an additional corrup-
tion-fighting role.122 An institution’s date of establishment, any rela-
tionship with a post-conflict peace agreement or transitional independ-
ence plan, and local conditions also influence the shape of these insti-
tutions.123 
                                                                                                                      
118 See id. However, it is difficult to demonstrate any substantial influence exerted by 
the ombudsmen in France and Great Britain because these institutions did not have ex-
press human rights mandates. 
119 See, e.g., European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 517–21. While the 
Swedish ombudsman had an express human rights mandate by 1987 and had the power to 
prosecute public officials, none of the Scandinavian nations have separate constitutional 
courts. See id. at 412–16, 460, 515–21. Additionally, none of the Scandinavian ombudsman 
institutions have mandates to bring court actions to determine the compatibility of legisla-
tion or treaties with constitutional human rights provisions. See id. 
120 See Reif, supra note 1, at 187–88. 
121 See Linda C. Reif, Introduction to The International Ombudsman Anthology: 
Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, supra note 10, at 
xxiii–xxvi; see also Elcock, supra note 112, at 362. 
122 See Reif, supra note 1, at 282–84; see also Bárbara Oliveira, Project Manager of the 
UNDP/OHCHR Capacity Building PDHJ Project & Valério Ximenes, Director of the Hu-
man Rights Division of the PDHJ, Paper Presented at the National Human Rights Institu-
tions Workshop: Creating Change? NHRIs’ (In)Action in the Asia-Pacific Region, The 
Provedor for Human Rights and Justice: First Boosting Years, Arduous Job Ahead 3–5 ( July 
22, 2009), http://iilah.unimelb.edu.au/files/NHRI_Workshop_Paper_PDHJ_BOliveira_ 
and_VXimenes.pdf. 
123 See Reif, supra note 121, at xxiii–xxvi. In particular, African and Asian governments 
are more likely to give an anti-corruption mandate to an ombudsman institution. See Reif, 
supra note 1, at 9–10, 215. 
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 In Africa, Uganda and Namibia established the first human rights 
ombudsman institutions.124 Uganda’s Inspector-General of Govern-
ment, as established in 1987, had human rights protection and anti-
corruption mandates but only classical ombudsman-type powers.125 
Namibia’s ombudsman—established in the 1990 Constitution after the 
U.N.-assisted transition to independence from South African control— 
has multiple mandates, including administrative oversight and human 
rights, anti-corruption, and environmental protection.126 The Namib-
ian ombudsman was also given stronger powers to refer matters to 
other public officials for prosecution, bring court proceedings to halt 
government action and challenge the validity of laws, and provide legal 
assistance to persons engaged in constitutional human rights litiga-
tion.127 For these first human rights ombudsman institutions in Africa, 
no colonial links influenced the particular hybrid model they chose, 
and few hybrids were found elsewhere in the world at the time.128 
B. Limited State Resources 
 Industrialized, transitional, and developing countries engage in 
government budget-cutting exercises for various reasons. Localized or 
widespread economic crises occur on a regular basis.129 Some govern-
ments are ideologically predisposed to limit government action and 
spending or wish to reign in the spending of a prior administration.130 
Consequently, giving multiple mandates to a new institution, or adding 
additional oversight mandates to an existing institution, are attractive 
alternatives for governments seeking to cut public expenditures. Low 
levels of state resources, and sometimes a desire to devote minimal re-
sources to the operation of good governance and human rights institu-
tions, are factors leading to the establishment of the multiple mandate, 
                                                                                                                      
124 See Reif, supra note 1, at 221–23. 
125 See id. at 232. The human rights mandate of Uganda’s Inspector General was trans-
ferred to a human rights commission in 1995. Id. 
126 See id. at 234–37. 
127 See id. at 235–36. 
128 See id. at 224, 231, 234 (noting the hybrid models of Namibia and Uganda and the 
political history underlying the founding of these institutions). 
129 See Jorge Madrazo Cuellar, The Ombudsman and His Relationship with Human Rights, 
Poverty and Development, in 2 The International Ombudsman Yearbook, supra note 9, at 
129, 132 (noting that neo-liberal economic policies contributed to economic problems in 
places such as Latin America). 
130 See id. 
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single office-holder ombudsman in developing countries, especially in 
Africa and Asia.131 
 The shape of human rights ombudsman institutions in developed 
countries is also changing because of the additional financial resources 
inherent in establishing separate horizontal accountability institu-
tions.132 The cost-saving rationale may also be a reason for merging 
separate institutions. These considerations may result in the transforma-
tion of a classical ombudsman into a human rights ombudsman, an ex-
pansion of the mandates of an existing human rights ombudsman, or 
the creation of a new hybrid institution.133 For example, a 2009 gov-
ernment report recommended that the Children’s Ombudsman in Ire-
land be merged into the general ombudsman institution.134 If it had 
been implemented, this change would have turned Ireland’s classical 
ombudsman into a human rights ombudsman.135 In France, 2011 legis-
lation will eliminate the country’s independent Défenseur des Enfants and 
entrust its child protection functions to a deputy within a larger De-
fender of Rights institution.136 
C. International Initiatives to Establish National Human Rights Institutions 
 Over the past twenty-five years, the international community has 
placed greater emphasis on the implementation of states’ international 
human rights obligations at the domestic level through the establish-
ment and strengthening of NHRIs.137 The U.N. standards for NHRIs, 
popularly called the “Paris Principles,” were drafted in the early 
1990s.138 Although not legally binding, the Paris Principles are consid-
                                                                                                                      
131 See Reif, supra note 1, at 88; Oliveira & Ximenes, supra note 122, at 1 n.2. 
132 See Reif, supra note 1, at 406 (noting the financial impact of retaining an inde-
pendent ombudsman capable of performing its functions). 
133 See id. at 88 (“One factor [for establishing hybrid institutions] is that fewer financial 
and human resources are needed to operate one office rather than two separate institu-
tions.”). 
134 See Barry O’Halloran & Ruadhán MacCormaic, Merger of State Bodies Would Save €83m, 
Irish Times, July 17, 2009, at 9. 
135 See Reif, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that a human rights ombudsman “combines 
both the ombudsman and human rights commission roles”). 
136 See Loi organique 2011-334 du 29 mars 2011 relative au Défenseur des droits [Law 334 
of March 29, 2011 Relative to the Defender of Rights] (in force April 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023781252&dateTex
te=. See generally Le Défenseur des Enfants, http://www.defenseurdesenfants.fr/ (last vis-
ited May 8, 2011) (detailing recent developments). 
137 See Reif, supra note 50, at 275 (“The United Nations has recently affirmed the sig-
nificance of national human rights institutions for the protection and promotion of hu-
man rights . . . .”). 
138 See G.A. Res. 48/134, ¶¶ 1–13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
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ered to be the core standards for independent and effective NHRIs.139 
Although the Paris Principles suggest a human rights commission as 
the model NHRI, the U.N. began to accept human rights ombudsmen 
as NHRIs later in the 1990s.140 In 1994, an International Coordinating 
Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights was established under the auspices of the U.N.’s High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and later created a NHRI accredita-
tion process that, in effect, grants its highest accreditation only to hu-
man rights commissions and human rights ombudsman institutions.141 
Paralleling this move, U.N. human rights treaty committees have issued 
general comments that call on contracting state parties in major U.N. 
human rights treaties to establish or strengthen NHRIs and have also 
made recommendations to states on the establishment and strengthen-
ing of NHRIs in concluding observations to periodic state reports.142 
 On a regional basis, both the Council of Europe (COE) and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) have strongly supported the 
human rights ombudsman model.143 In particular, the mandate of the 
COE’s Commissioner for Human Rights includes facilitating the activi-
ties of national ombudsmen or similar institutions in the human rights 
field in COE member states.144 This is unsurprising because the human 
                                                                                                                      
139 See Reif, supra note 1, at 95–96. 
140 See G.A. Res. 48/134, supra note 138, ¶¶ 1–13. It is no coincidence, given that the 
number of human rights ombudsman institutions accelerated rapidly during the first half of 
the 1990s. See Linda C. Reif, The Shifting Boundaries of NHRI Definition in the International Sys-
tem, in Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Hu-
man Rights Institutions (Ryan Goodman & Thomas Pegram eds., forthcoming 2011). For 
example, in 1995 “ombudsmen” were recognized by the U.N. Centre for Human Rights as 
one NHRI category, but the description focused mainly on the classical ombudsman format 
and there was no recognition of the various human rights protection powers given to human 
rights ombudsman institutions. See U.N. Ctr. for Human Rights, National Human 
Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of Na-
tional Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶¶ 41, 56–
62, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/4 (1995) [hereinafter U.N. Centre for Human Rights Hand-
book]. 
141 See Rachel Murray, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions at the 
International and Regional Levels: The Experience of Africa 30–31 (2007). For full 
accreditation, commissions and human rights ombudsmen must comply with the Paris 
Principles as fleshed out by ICC General Observations. See id. at 42. 
142 See id. at 31; Reif, supra note 1, at 116–21. 
143 See Reif, supra note 140. 
144 See Eur. Consult. Parl., Resolution on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights, art. 3, 104th Sess., Res. No. 99 (50) (May 7, 1999), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ 
wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=458513&Site=COE. 
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rights ombudsman format originated in Europe and quickly became 
the predominant model in both Europe and Latin America.145 
 Some NHRIs have been externally imposed by international ac-
tors.146 In particular, post-conflict peace-building processes undertaken 
by the U.N. and regional organizations resulted in the establishment or 
strengthening of NHRIs, most often employing human rights om-
budsmen during the peace processes in Latin American and Central 
and Eastern European nations.147 As part of the good governance ini-
tiatives launched in the late 1990s, international financial institutions 
and donor states pressured other nations to establish or strengthen 
NHRIs.148 Pegram argues, however, that the concept of diffusion of 
NHRIs by coercion is of limited use in explaining their increased popu-
larity during this period.149 
 Given the Paris Principles’ focus on the human rights commission, 
the large number of human rights ombudsmen established during the 
first half of the 1990s must have been due to the influence of factors 
other than these standards.150 These influences were likely regional 
rather than international in nature. In Europe and Latin America, in-
ter- and intra-regional legal transplantation was probably the initial 
cause, and the support of regional organizations such as the COE and 
later the OAS likely continued the trend.151 Nevertheless, as the U.N. 
increasingly acknowledged human rights ombudsmen as NHRIs, U.N. 
                                                                                                                      
145 See Reif, supra note 1, at 172. 
146 See id. at 260–84. 
147 See id. (discussing the post-conflict peace-building processes in El Salvador, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor). 
148 See id. at 77. 
149 See Pegram, supra note 78, at 760. 
150 See Reif, supra note 1, at 88–89, 96. In addition to the pre-1990 Spanish, Portu-
guese, Swedish, Polish, Guatemalan, and Ugandan institutions, the following human rights 
ombudsman institutions were enshrined in law early on: Hungary (1990 constitution, 
1992–1993 law); Slovenia (1991 constitution, 1993 law); Lithuania (1992 constitution, 1994 
law); Croatia (1990 constitution, 1992 law); Macedonia (1991 constitution); Russia (1993 
constitution); El Salvador (1992 constitutional amendment and law); Costa Rica (1992 
law); Honduras (1992 decree, 1995 constitution); Nicaragua (1995 constitutional reform 
and law); Colombia (1991 constitution, 1992 law); Argentina (1993 law, 1994 constitu-
tion); Peru (1993 constitution, 1995 law); Bolivia (1994 constitution); Paraguay (1992 
constitution, 1995 law); Belize (1994 law); Ethiopia (1994 constitution); Lesotho (1993 
constitution); Malawi (1994 constitution); Namibia (1990 constitution and law); and Sey-
chelles (1993 constitution). See id. at 126, 141, 145, 157–59, 172, 188–90, 206–07, 220–23. 
151 See id. at 89–93; see also Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: Inter-
national Law in Domestic Politics 110–11 (2009) (discussing empirical research find-
ing that governments are influenced by other governments in the same region in decisions 
whether to and to what extent to make commitments under the core U.N. human rights 
treaties). 
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standards, interpretations, recommendations, and accreditation rules 
inevitably would have exerted more influence on the establishment of 
human rights ombudsmen. 
D. Treaties and Other International Initiatives that Use NHRIs  
for Domestic Implementation 
 A growing number of recent U.N. human rights treaties and initia-
tives call on nation states to establish or use existing NHRIs to imple-
ment their treaty obligations and improve human rights protections.152 
States have reacted by creating NHRIs—including human rights om-
budsmen—or by adding a human rights protection mandate to the du-
ties of their existing ombudsman.153 The following section discusses the 
impact of developments in the areas of children’s rights; the prevention 
of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment; and multinational corporations and human rights on these 
institutions.154 
1. Children’s Rights Protection: The U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 
 The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ratified by 
nearly every nation state, contains civil, political, economic, social, cul-
tural, and protective rights for children and youth.155 In 2002, the U.N. 
Committee on the Rights of the Child issued General Comment Num-
ber Two, which stated that CRC parties should establish independent 
NHRIs, children’s ombudsmen, or children’s commissioners to pro-
mote and monitor the implementation of the CRC, using a thematic 
institution in states with enough resources or a “broad-based NHRI that 
includes a specific focus on children” in states with limited resources.156 
                                                                                                                      
 
152 See Reif, supra note 1, at 97–99, 116–23. 
153 See id. at 82–83. 
154 See infra Part II.D; see also Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, art. 33, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 ( Jan. 24, 2007); Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. 
Res. 61/177, art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 ( Jan. 12, 2007). European Union direc-
tives combating discrimination are being implemented by member states’ thematic institu-
tions or by human rights ombudsmen. See Equinet, http://www.equineteurope.org (last 
visited May 8, 2011). 
155 See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
156 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, The Role of Independent National Human 
Rights Institutions in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child, ¶ 6, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/GC/2002/2 (Nov. 15, 2002). The General Comment also states that if a broad-
294 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:269 
Unfortunately, a relatively small number of parties to the CRC have es-
tablished children’s ombudsman institutions to date, and there is little 
uniformity.157 
 Rather than create a separate office or institution, states are more 
likely to use their human rights ombudsman or commission to address 
children’s rights and to implement the CRC. For example, in Latin 
American and European countries, some human rights ombudsmen 
have developed internal departments for children’s rights protection 
that place a special focus on investigations involving children.158 The 
Greek government responded to the U.N. Committee on the Rights of 
the Child recommendations in 2003.159 Greece’s legislation expanded 
the mandate of its human rights ombudsman to include the defense 
and promotion of children’s rights, established a Deputy Ombudsman 
for Children, and gave the institution jurisdiction over both the public 
and private sectors in matters concerning children.160 In 1995, 
Finland’s Parliamentary Ombudsman was transformed into a human 
rights ombudsman, and in 1998 the parliament requested that the om-
budsman place a special focus on children’s rights.161 Regardless of 
their form, human rights ombudsman institutions worldwide are in-
creasingly addressing children’s rights issues through the performance 
of their duties. 
                                                                                                                      
based NHRI is used, it should have either an identifiable commissioner specifically respon-
sible for children’s rights or a specific section or division responsible for children’s rights. 
See id. 
157 See Members, Eur. Network of Ombudspersons for Child., http://www.crin.org/ 
enoc/members/index.asp (last visited May 8, 2011) (listing children’s rights ombudsmen 
in thirty-one European nations). 
158 See Linda C. Reif, The Ombudsman and the Protection of Children’s Rights, 17 Asia Pac. 
L. Rev. 27, 38–48 (2009) (discussing such developments in Finland, Spain, and Greece). 
159 See id. at 46–48. 
160 See id. at 46–47. 
161 See id. at 39; Children’s Rights, Parliamentary Ombudsman of Fin. (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource.phx/eoa/english/ombudsman/tasks/childrensrig
hts.htx. 
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2. Designation of the Human Rights Ombudsman as a National 
Preventive Mechanism Under OPCAT 
 On June 22, 2006, OPCAT entered into force.162 OPCAT is de-
signed to enhance the implementation of state obligations in the Con-
vention Against Torture, one of the U.N.’s core human rights treaties.163 
Article One of OPCAT creates a system for independent international 
and domestic bodies to conduct regular visits to facilities where persons 
are “deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”164 State parties 
are required to establish, designate, or maintain one or more inde-
pendent domestic visiting bodies, called national preventive mecha-
nisms (NPMs), that give due consideration to the Paris Principles in 
conducting these visits.165 Moreover, states must allow regular visits by 
the NPMs to facilities where persons are deprived of their liberty.166 The 
purpose of these visits is to strengthen the protection of persons de-
tained in these facilities.167 The NPMs must be given powers to examine 
detained persons, make recommendations to the government with re-
spect to relevant obligations of international law, and submit observa-
tions and proposals concerning extant or proposed legislation.168 
 Some OPCAT states have established a new institution as their 
NPM; others utilize an existing human rights commission.169 A pre-
existing human rights ombudsman is often well-suited to this task: some 
ombudsman institutions, particularly those in Europe, already have the 
power to inspect facilities where persons are involuntarily detained and, 
thus, a number of OPCAT state parties have designated their human 
                                                                                                                      
162 See Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 57/199, Dec. 18, 2002, 2375 U.N.T.S. 237 (entered into 
force June 22, 2006) [hereinafter OPCAT]. As of May 8, 2011, there were fifty-seven contract-
ing parties and sixty-eight signatories to OPCAT. See Status, U.N. Treaty Collection (May 8, 
2011, 07:03:16 EDT), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ 
no=IV-9-b&chapter=4&lang=en. 
163 See OPCAT, supra note 162, preamble. 
164 Id. The international body is the U.N. Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of the U.N. Committee 
Against Torture, which has powers similar to the NPMs. See id. art. 2. 
165 Id. arts. 2, 3. 
166 Id. art. 4. 
167 Id. 
168 See OPCAT, supra note 162, art. 19. 
169 See generally Global Status of Ratifications, Signatures and NPM Designations, Ass’n for 
the Prevention of Torture (Nov. 2010), http://www.apt.ch/npm/OPCAT1110.pdf (list-
ing fifty-seven states parties, thirty-four of which had designated an NPM as of November 
2010). 
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rights ombudsman as an OPCAT NPM.170 A few nations, such as Den-
mark, New Zealand, and Luxembourg, have even designated their clas-
sical ombudsman as their NPM or as one of a number of NPMs.171 
These designations demonstrate that European nations are the most 
predisposed to designate their human rights or classical ombudsman 
institutions as OPCAT NPMs.172 Designating human rights ombudsmen 
as OPCAT NPMs adds another important human rights protection 
function to the institution and increases the institution’s ties to the in-
ternational human rights community. 
3. Multinational Corporations, Human Rights, and NHRIs 
 In recent years, the U.N. human rights overseers have turned their 
gaze to the behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs) and their 
role in human rights breaches. In April 2008, John Ruggie, the U.N. 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Business and Human 
Rights, issued a report entitled “Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Frame-
work for Business and Human Rights” (“Ruggie Report”).173 One of the 
core principles of the Ruggie Report is the need for more effective judi-
                                                                                                                      
170 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 491–92 (providing list of 
ombudsmen in Europe with inspection powers). As of November 2010, the human rights 
ombudsman institutions in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova (with NGOs), Peru, Poland, Slovenia (with 
NGOs), Spain, and Sweden (with the Chancellor of Justice) have been designated as NPMs. 
See Global Status of Ratifications, Signatures and NPM Designations, supra note 169, at 1–4. The 
human rights ombudsman institutions in Croatia, Finland, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, Nicara-
gua, and Ukraine are under consideration for designation as NPMs. See id.; Summary of the 
Annual Report 2007, Parliamentary Ombudsman of Fin., 24 (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www. 
oikeusasiamies.fi/dman/Document.phx?documentId=vl22108104517482&cmd=download. 
171 See Changes to Jurisdiction of the New Zealand Ombudsmen Institution, IOI Newsletter 
(Int’l Ombudsman Inst.), Dec. 2008, at 7, http://www.theioi.com/publications/i-o-i-
newsletter (follow “IOI Newsletter_200812_English” hyperlink) [hereinafter I.O.I. News-
letter] (noting that the Human Rights Commission is the central NPM); Global Status of 
Ratifications, Signatures and NPM Designations, supra note 169, at 2, 3; The OPCAT Tasks: Gen-
eral Principles, Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman (Aug. 28, 2009), http://en. 
ombudsmanden.dk/opcat/. One might argue that giving an OPCAT NPM designation to 
a classical ombudsman pushes the institution into the human rights ombudsman category 
because the institution acquires an express and ongoing role in implementing the state’s 
human rights treaty obligations. See Reif, supra note 1, at 82–83. Consequently, this posi-
tion would increase the number of human rights ombudsmen relative to classical om-
budsman institutions. 
172 See Global Status of Ratifications, Signatures and NPM Designations, supra note 169, at 2–4. 
173 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, ¶¶ 10, 17, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) ( John Ruggie) [here-
inafter Ruggie Report]. 
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cial and non-judicial remedies for victims of corporate human rights 
violations; NHRIs are specifically included as non-judicial remedies to 
investigate and punish human rights breaches by companies.174 The 
Ruggie Report states, “The actual and potential importance of these in-
stitutions cannot be overstated. Where NHRIs are able to address griev-
ances involving companies, they can provide a means to hold business 
accountable. NHRIs are particularly well-positioned to provide proc-
esses—whether adjudicative or mediation-based—that are culturally ap-
propriate, accessible, and expeditious.”175 The Ruggie Report was ac-
companied by research on eighty-five NHRIs, finding that at least forty 
of these can handle complaints related to the human rights activities of 
companies.176 While this research is incomplete, the institutions listed 
are predominantly human rights commissions and human rights om-
budsman institutions.177 
 In June 2008, the U.N. Human Rights Council welcomed the Rug-
gie Report and extended Ruggie’s mandate for three more years so he 
could “operationalize” his report.178 Regarding non-judicial remedies, 
Ruggie has indicated that his “focus is on how to strengthen existing 
mechanisms, and identifying where new ones might be required.”179 
Consequently, there will likely be an increasing U.N. and state interest 
in the use of human rights ombudsman institutions and commissions 
in the investigation of human rights breaches by corporate actors. Clas-
sical ombudsmen, lacking an express human rights protection mandate 
and with a limited, public sector jurisdiction, will probably not have the 
same attraction.180 This may also provide the impetus for some states to 
transition their classical ombudsman to a human rights ombudsman. 
The jurisdiction of human rights ombudsmen, however, remains as a 
potential stumbling block: most MNC conduct occurs in the private 
sector, and the authority of many human rights ombudsmen is limited 
                                                                                                                      
174 See id. ¶¶ 84–85. 
175 Id. ¶ 97. 
176 Id. ¶ 96. 
177 See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Business and Human 
Rights: A Survey of NHRI Practices, 5–36 (2008), available at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/ (search “A survey of NHRI practices”; then follow “[DOC] Business and 
Human Rights: A Survey of NHRI [National Human Rights Institutions] Practices” hyper-
link) (NHRIs on the list appear to be only those that are ICC-accredited). 
178 John G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the U.N. Sec’y Gen., Prepared Remarks: 
Public Hearings on Business and Human Rights, Bus. & Hum. Rts. Resource Centre, 4 (Apr. 
16, 2009), http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-remarks-to-European-Parliament-16-Apr-2009.pdf. 
179 Id. 
180 See Reif, supra note 1, at 2–3, 8–9. 
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to the public sector.181 Accordingly, the jurisdiction and authority of 
human rights ombudsmen would have to be extended to private sector 
activity before they could investigate MNCs.182 
III. Human Rights Ombudsman Mandates: Core Powers and 
Operating Practices 
 There is no uniform model for a human rights ombudsman. Hu-
man rights ombudsman institutions vary considerably in their structure, 
functions, and powers, and these differences are often seen both intra- 
and inter- regionally. For example, except for Spain and Portugal, most 
Western European human rights ombudsman institutions more closely 
reflect the classical ombudsman model of investigation, recommenda-
tion, and reporting.183 In contrast, human rights ombudsman institu-
tions in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe typically have 
more extensive powers.184 Hybrid ombudsman institutions with human 
rights mandates in other parts of the world vary widely: some are limited 
to the classical powers, while others have expanded authority.185 
 Both a comprehensive survey of the many human rights ombuds-
man institutions worldwide and the effectiveness of individual institu-
tions are beyond the scope of this Article. NHRI effectiveness at any 
point in time is determined by many interrelated legal and non-legal 
factors.186 From the perspective of comparative law, the functional suc-
                                                                                                                      
 
181 See id. at 3; Reif, supra note 158, at 47. 
182 See Ruggie Report, supra note 173, ¶¶ 84–85. 
183 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 79 (noting that Andorra’s 
Citizen’s Advocate reflects the classical model discussed); The Parliamentary Ombudsmen—JO, 
Parliamentary Ombudsman (Swed.), http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?MenuId=12&Object 
Class=DynamX_Documents&Language=en (last visited May 8, 2011) (investigations on 
complaint or own-motion, recommendations, reporting, inspections, power to prosecute 
public officials, power to initiate disciplinary procedures, OPCAT NPM); The Tasks of the Om-
budsman, Parliamentary Ombudsman of Fin., http://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource. 
phx/eoa/english/ombudsman/tasks/index.htx (last visited May 8, 2011); What is the Greek 
Ombudsman, Greek Ombudsman, http://www.synigoros.gr/en_what_is.htm (last visited May 
8, 2011) (investigations on complaint or own-motion, recommendations, reporting, private 
sector jurisdiction over children’s rights matters). 
184 See Reif, supra note 1, at 191. 
185 See id. at 209–12, 222, 234–37, 282–84 (noting that institutions in Namibia, Sey-
chelles, East Timor, and Jamaica have more expansive powers). 
186 See id. at 395–410; Reif, supra note 140. These legal and non-legal factors include 
compliance with the Paris Principles, democratic government, independence of the NHRI, 
broad jurisdiction over human rights matters, sufficient powers to carry out the NHRI’s 
mandate, the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, the appointment of 
an ombudsman and staff with the appropriate expertise, experience and pluralism to han-
dle all mandates successfully, accessibility of the institution, cooperative relationships with 
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cess—or lack thereof—of ombudsman transplants is also beyond the 
scope of this Article given that many, if not all, of the same factors come 
into play in individual jurisdictions in determining this question.187 In-
stead, the following section engages in a more limited undertaking: it 
examines a selection of the core legal powers granted to, and operating 
practices instituted by, human rights ombudsman institutions. In doing 
so, it highlights those that should be regarded as essential for all hu-
man rights ombudsman institutions. 
A. Specialized Ombudsman Institutions, Deputy Ombudsmen, and Designated 
Units or Departments 
 When a government adopts the human rights ombudsman model, 
it must decide whether to create one institution or several, depending 
on the human rights needs of the state or territory.188 Furthermore, a 
government can create multiple human rights ombudsman institu-
tions.189 For example, Hungary has separate parliamentary commis-
sioners for civil rights, national and ethnic minority rights, environ-
mental protection (“future generations”), and data protection and free-
dom of information, although they are all housed in the same 
building.190 Due to the forces described above, it is far more common 
for jurisdictions to establish one human rights ombudsman institution 
rather than multiple thematic institutions.191 Moreover, institutions tend 
to create sub-specialties where human rights and general administrative 
oversight functions are separated.192 Sometimes there is even specializa-
tion in particular areas of human rights.193 
                                                                                                                      
human rights NGOs and international organizations, government support of the institu-
tion and responsiveness to its recommendations, and a positive public image of the institu-
tion and its ability to effect improvements in human rights protection and government 
administration. See generally U.N. Centre for Human Rights Handbook, supra note 140 
(encouraging the establishment of strong NHRIs and explaining how to establish such 
institutions). 
187 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
188 See Reif, supra note 1, at 11; Fernando Alvarez de Miranda y Torres, Human Rights and 
Their Function in the Institutional Strengthening of the Ombudsman, in 2 The International Om-
budsman Yearbook, supra note 9, at 146, 147. 
189 See Reif, supra note 1, at 11. 
190 See Parliamentary Commissioners’ Off. of Hung., http://www.obh.hu/index_ 
en.htm (last visited May 8, 2011). The U.N. has exhibited conflicting views on multiple, 
thematic NHRIs. See Reif, supra note 140. While the ICC prefers one general-service NHRI 
in a state, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child calls for thematic NHRIs for 
children, at least in developed states. See id. 
191 See Reif, supra note 140; supra Part II.A–C. 
192 See Reif, supra note 1, at 88. 
193 See Reif, supra note 140. 
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 Specialization can be accomplished through a variety of legal pro-
visions and operating practices. These include the appointment of 
deputy ombudsmen for specific human rights areas by the legislature, 
or a more informal appointment by the ombudsman without an ex-
press legislative mandate.194 Another common practice is to create 
separate departments or units for different focus areas. For example, 
numerous Latin American human rights ombudsman institutions have 
departments for women’s rights and children’s rights.195 As discussed 
above, growing numbers of human rights ombudsmen are being desig-
nated as OPCAT NPMs.196 This trend is expected to produce more in-
ternal specialization: Costa Rica’s Defensor de los Habitantes has already 
created an NPM unit.197 
B. The Ombudsman’s Jurisdiction over Government Departments  
and Human Rights 
 The breadth of a human rights ombudsman’s jurisdiction plays a 
crucial role in the ability of the institution to protect human rights.198 A 
human rights ombudsman should have jurisdiction over all of the gov-
ernment departments, agencies, and other public bodies that are possi-
ble rights-infringers.199 In particular, a human rights ombudsman 
should have jurisdiction over the police, armed forces, immigration and 
refugee departments, prisons, detention centers, young offender cen-
                                                                                                                      
194 See id. Legislative provisions are less common but do exist. For example, legislation 
created the Deputy Ombudsman for Children of Greece and a legislative enactment will 
place a deputy Défenseur des Enfants inside France’s Defender of Rights institution. See Rachel 
Hodgkin & Peter Newell, The Role and Mandate of Children’s Ombudspersons in Europe: Safeguard-
ing and Promoting Children’s Rights and Ensuring Children’s Views Are Taken Seriously, Eur. Net-
work Ombudspersons for Child., 2, 10, 17, 36, 40 (Dec. 2010), http://www.crin.org/docs/ 
ENOC%20Malta%20report%20final.pdf; Members, supra note 157. Legislation may also stipu-
late that there be a deputy focusing on women’s rights, such as in Ethiopia. See Reif, supra 
note 1, at 114–15. The Ethiopian deputy also focuses on children’s rights. See id. 
195 See Reif, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
196 See Reif, supra note 140; supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text. 
197 See Global Status of Ratifications, Signatures and NPM Designations, supra note 169, at 2. 
Other human rights ombudsman offices do not create distinct departments, but allocate 
tasks differently. See Reif, supra note 158, at 40. For example, Finland’s Parliamentary Om-
budsman, a human rights ombudsman institution, has two deputies, and subject-matter 
areas are divided between the three appointees. See id. 
198 See Reif, supra note 1, at 87. 
199 See Reif, supra note 140 (“[S]ince ombudsmen scrutinize administrative conduct 
they regularly investigate authorities that are infringing human rights such as the police, 
prisons and immigration authorities.”). 
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ters, and other facilities where persons are held involuntarily.200 For ex-
ample, investigations by a wide variety of ombudsman institutions into 
child protection matters show that governments can infringe on chil-
dren’s rights not only through the conduct of child welfare, criminal 
justice, and police authorities, but also through the behavior of depart-
ments in charge of health, education, prison, immigration, and asylum, 
among others.201 
 A human rights ombudsman should also have jurisdiction over a 
broad range of specific human rights. In addition to civil and political 
rights, economic, social, and cultural rights should also fall within the 
institution’s mandate. Jurisdiction over these rights is particularly im-
portant given that they are often non-justiciable; thus, an NHRI like a 
human rights ombudsman may be the only venue for members of the 
public to complain about their violation.202 In fact, complaints con-
cerning health, education, and other social services are quite common 
for human rights ombudsmen.203 
                                                                                                                     
C. Jurisdiction over Private Sector Actors 
 One typical characteristic of the ombudsman institution is that its 
jurisdiction is limited to public sector conduct only, usually the admin-
istrative or executive branch of government and rarely the judicial 
branch.204 While a growing number of all types of ombudsman institu-
tions have jurisdiction over private actors providing public services, a 
minority of human rights ombudsmen have more extensive jurisdiction 
over private sector conduct.205 For example, human rights ombudsman 
institutions in Namibia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, 
and Papua New Guinea have jurisdiction over private persons in hu-
man rights cases to differing degrees.206 In Europe, some human rights 
 
200 See id. Some authorities (for example, the armed forces or immigration authorities) 
may not exist in sub-national jurisdictions with a human rights ombudsman, but jurisdic-
tion over the full spectrum of facilities for involuntary detention is essential if an om-
budsman is to be designated as an OPCAT NPM. See id. 
201 See Reif, supra note 1, at 330–31, 302. 
202 See id. at 113. 
203 See id. at 402. 
204 See id. 11–13, 302 (noting different types of ombudsman jurisdiction over the judi-
cial branch in Sweden, Finland, Slovenia, Albania, and Costa Rica). 
205 See id. at 401–02. 
206 See Reif, supra note 1, at 3, 402, 403. Hybrid commissions in Ghana and Tanzania 
also have jurisdiction over private sector conduct. See id. 
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ombudsmen have subject-specific jurisdiction over private actors.207 
Portugal’s Provedor de Justiça has limited jurisdiction over private sector 
entities that involve a special relationship of dominion in the protec-
tion of rights.208 Greece’s ombudsman has jurisdiction over violations 
of children’s rights allegedly committed by private persons.209 As ar-
gued earlier, there will likely be growing pressure on states to expand 
the jurisdiction of NHRIs to include private corporate conduct.210 
                                                                                                                     
D. Own-Motion Investigation Power 
 Many classical and human rights ombudsman institutions have the 
power to launch investigations on their own motion.211 Own-motion 
investigations can be used in a variety of situations to enhance human 
rights protection—because the ombudsman need not wait for an actual 
complaint, she can be more proactive in monitoring events in her ju-
risdiction.212 The ombudsman can monitor the media for reports on 
behavior that may constitute the target of an own-motion investiga-
tion.213 If the ombudsman has the power to inspect facilities where per-
sons are detained involuntarily, such visits may bring to light situations 
which the ombudsman may desire to investigate.214 Thus, own-motion 
investigations can benefit vulnerable populations such as prisoners, 
children, and the mentally ill, because they are less likely or entirely 
unable to complain themselves. Furthermore, a pattern of complaints 
about the same matter may indicate a systemic problem involving hu-
man rights issues; an own-motion investigation can be an effective 
mechanism to address larger systemic problems in addition to the indi-
vidual concerns.215 
 
207 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 493 (listing Cyprus, Es-
tonia, Greece, Latvia, and Portugal as examples); Equinet, supra note 154. 
208 See Reif, supra note 1, at 3, 141–42. 
209 See id. at 153. 
210 See Ruggie Report, supra note 173, ¶¶ 84–85. Admittedly, this extension of jurisdic-
tion could have its disadvantages. It has the potential to generate large numbers of com-
plaints or investigations that drain financial and human resources, possibly resulting in 
backlogs and delays. 
211 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 21. For example, most 
ombudsmen in Europe have own-motion investigatory power. See id. at 21, 490. 
212 See Reif, supra note 1, at 3, 403; Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Ombudsman as a 
Non-Traditional Tool for Citizen Participation, in 2 The International Ombudsman Year-
book, supra note 9, at 189, 193–95. 
213 See Reif, supra note 1, at 3, 403. 
214 See Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 212, at 194–95; Reif, supra note 50, at 273. 
215 See Reif, supra note 1, at 104; Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 212, at 193–95. 
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 Examples of own-motion investigations of human rights issues 
abound. The public reports of these investigations are valuable, persua-
sive tools for ombudsmen to use in effecting legal or political reform. 
For example, various human rights ombudsman institutions have con-
ducted own-motion investigations concerning children and their rights, 
covering matters such as the child welfare system, the child custody 
process, delays in investigation of alleged sexual abuse of children, po-
lice treatment of minors, the juvenile justice sector, the treatment of 
children in schools, and repatriation procedures for unaccompanied 
immigrant minors.216 Because many affected individuals are unable to 
lodge complaints themselves, all human rights ombudsman institutions 
should be given strong own-motion investigation powers. 
E. Inspection Powers 
 A number of human rights and classical ombudsman institutions 
have the statutory power to inspect places where persons are involun-
tarily detained to insure against inappropriate treatment.217 The in-
spection power can cover a broad range of locations, including prisons, 
detention centers, immigration facilities, young offender centers, and 
mental health care facilities.218 In the early 1990s an empirical study of 
ombudsman institutions in forty-eight nations found that sixty-six of 
seventy-six institutions (86.8%) had an inspection power.219 More re-
cently, a survey of ombudsman institutions found that most, but not all, 
of the human rights ombudsmen throughout Europe have the power 
to inspect a range of facilities.220 Additionally, a strong inspection 
                                                                                                                      
216 See Reif, supra note 158, at 41–48. 
217 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 41–42; supra note 214 
and accompanying text. 
218 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 41–42. 
219 See Udo Kempf & Marco Mille, The Role and the Function of the Ombudsman: Personal-
ised Parliamentary Control in Forty-Eight Different States, in The International Ombudsman 
Anthology: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, 
supra note 10, at 195, 213. 
220 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 41–42, 491–92 (finding 
ombudsman inspection powers mainly in Central and Western Europe, including Andorra, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain). The recent inspection work of the Czech 
Republic and Lithuania human rights ombudsmen provide examples of this power. See The 
Work of Ombudsmen & Similar Bodies, European Ombudsman—Newsletter, Apr. 2009, at 
39–40, 55–56, available at https://oldbookshop.publications.europa.eu/eubookshop/down 
load.action?fileName=QKAB09012ENC_002.pdf&eubphfUid=10243311&catalogNbr=QK- 
AB-09-012-EN-C. 
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power backed up by adequate financial support is essential for an om-
budsman that has been assigned OPCAT NPM duties.221 
                                                                                                                     
 In short, inspection powers should be given to all human rights 
ombudsman institutions. They should be exercisable by the ombuds-
man on her own motion at any time, cover the full range of detention 
facilities, and include powers sufficient to satisfy any international obli-
gations of the state under OPCAT. These powers should be exercised 
regularly. 
F. Litigation Powers: The Constitutional Court and Other Legal Interventions 
 Many national human rights ombudsmen in Europe and Latin 
America, where civil law systems dominate, have been given additional 
powers. They may bring actions on constitutional matters involving 
human rights to a constitutional or supreme court, become involved in 
administrative court proceedings, and prosecute public officials.222 Pro-
fessor Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer’s survey of European ombudsmen 
provides the following information: four human rights ombudsmen 
can start criminal proceedings, while many can recommend that they 
be instituted; seven can initiate disciplinary proceedings, while many 
can recommend that they be instituted; eleven can make applications 
before administrative or other courts; and many have the right to bring 
actions before the nation’s constitutional court.223 
 To summarize, the number and form of European ombudsman 
actions before constitutional courts varies, but a fair number can chal-
lenge the constitutionality of laws and two can contest the constitu-
tional compatibility of treaties.224 Several can contest the constitutional-
ity of government action in individual cases.225 Several may take the 
 
221 See generally Global Status of Ratifications, Signatures and NPM Designations, supra note 
169 (listing fifty-four states parties, thirty-seven of which had designated an NPM as of No-
vember 2010). For example, Poland’s Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection was desig-
nated as the nation’s NPM on January 18, 2008 and carried out seventy-three visits in 2008 
in fulfillment of his OPCAT duties. See European Union Law, European Ombudsman—
Newsletter, Apr. 2009, at 32, available at https://oldbookshop.publications.europa.eu/ 
eubookshop/download.action?fileName=QKAB09012ENC_002.pdf&eubphfUid=10243311 
&catalogNbr=QK-AB-09-012-EN-C. 
222 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 51–53, 55–56. Given 
the number of institutions with these powers, a full survey is not possible within the scope 
of this Article. 
223 See id. at 53–56, 508–10, 515–20. These numbers do not include classical ombuds-
men who may have some of these powers, including disciplinary or prosecution powers. See 
id. 
224 See id. at 51–53, 515–20. 
225 See id. 
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unusual approach of arguing that the government has acted unconsti-
tutionally by its failure to legislate.226 Lastly, some human rights om-
budsmen can request the interpretation of constitutional provisions.227 
 The Portuguese and Spanish institutions were the first to have 
constitutional court powers and provide contrasting examples of their 
frequency of use.228 The Portuguese Provedor de Justiça is empowered to 
refer two types of constitutionality actions before the Constitutional 
Court: (1) an action to determine whether laws are unconstitutional or 
illegal and (2) an assessment regarding whether the government has 
failed to comply with the constitution through the omission of legisla-
tive measures necessary to render constitutional norms binding.229 
Since it began operating in 1975, the Provedor has launched 175 actions 
before Portugal’s Constitutional Court.230 Spain’s Defensor del Pueblo is 
empowered to bring two types of actions before Spain’s Constitutional 
Court: (1) actions challenging the constitutionality of legislative action, 
known as abstract review and (2) actions in support of an individual’s 
core constitutional rights in concrete cases, known as concrete review 
or the amparo action.231 As compared with the Portuguese Provedor, the 
Spanish Defensor has launched substantially fewer constitutionality ac-
tions over a slightly shorter time frame; the amparo action before the 
Constitutional Court is rarely used because individuals have the same 
right of action.232 
                                                                                                                      
226 See id. at 354–55, 517–18 (citing Portugal as an example). 
227 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 53–55, 517–18. 
228 See Reif, supra note 42, at 36. 
229 See Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 7th Revision (2005), arts. 281–83, avail-
able at http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII_revisao_ 
definitive.pdf; Estatuto do Provedor de Justiça [Statute of Portugal’s Provider of Justice], Lei 
No. 9/91 de 9 de Abril, art. 20(3)–(4), available at http://www.provedor-jus.pt/legislacao/ 
estatutos.htm; The Work of Ombudsmen & Similar Bodies, supra note 220, at 62–63. 
230 See The Work of Ombudsmen & Similar Bodies, supra note 220, at 63 n.1. 
231 See Reif, supra note 1, at 147–48. 
232 See id. By the end of 2010, the Defensor had undertaken twenty-seven unconstitu-
tionality actions and ten amparo actions. Recursos de Amparo, Defensor del Pueblo, http:// 
www.defensordelpueblo.es/es/Documentacion/Recursos/amparo/index.html (last visited 
May 8, 2011); Recursos de Inconstitucionalidad, Defensor del Pueblo, http://www.defensor 
delpueblo.es/es/Documentacion/Recursos/inconstitucionalidad/index.html (last visited 
May 8, 2011). The Defensor has rejected many requests to launch unconstitutionality actions 
on the basis that they contained insufficient grounds for a feasible cause of action. See Emil 
Bălan & Gabriela Varia, The Ombudsman and the Judicial Power. The Romanian Experience, 26E 
Transylvanian Rev. Admin. Sci. 14, 27 (2009). Elsewhere in Europe, various Central and 
Eastern European human rights ombudsman institutions make regular use of their power to 
bring actions before their constitutional courts. See id. at 19–24, 28; Zubik, supra note 109, at 
190–91. 
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 The constitutional litigation power has also been influential in 
Latin America.233 Many Latin American human rights ombudsmen can 
take “unconstitutionality,” amparo, habeas corpus, and other actions in 
their country’s courts.234 Some Caribbean, African, and Asian human 
rights ombudsman institutions also have a variety of powers related to 
legal representation, such as providing financial support and legal ad-
vice to complainants who are launching their own constitutional litiga-
tion and taking court action.235 
 The vast majority of ombudsman institutions with prosecution 
powers, constitutional court litigation powers, or administrative court 
litigation powers exist in civil law states.236 Granting human rights om-
budsman institutions litigation powers in these discrete judicial struc-
tures is a workable—even efficient—procedure for achieving timely 
decisions on constitutional and administrative legal questions. Further 
research should be done to determine whether a human rights om-
budsman in a common law or pluralistic legal jurisdiction could oper-
ate in a cost-effective and timely manner with a litigation mandate. In 
common law jurisdictions, given their judicial branch structures, it may 
not even be possible to give a human rights ombudsman civil-law-type 
litigation powers. Giving amicus curiae or intervener functions to hu-
                                                                                                                      
233 See Reif, supra note 1, at 188–92. 
234 See id. at 188 & n.116, 189 & nn.118–20, 190 & nn.123–26, 192–93, 198, 201, 262 
(Argentina: unconstitutionality, amparo actions; Peru: unconstitutionality, amparo, habeas 
corpus, habeas data, popular actions; Guatemala: judicial processes; Costa Rica: unconstitu-
tionality, amparo, habeas corpus actions; Nicaragua: unconstitutionality, amparo, exhibicion 
personal actions; Panama: popular, nullity, amparo, habeas data actions; Colombia: unconsti-
tutionality, popular, tutela, habeas corpus actions; Ecuador: unconstitutionality, amparo, 
habeas data actions; Bolivia: unconstitutionality, nullification, amparo, habeas corpus ac-
tions; Venezuela: unconstitutionality, amparo, habeas corpus, habeas data actions; Paraguay: 
amparo, habeas corpus actions). A few of these institutions can also participate in adminis-
trative court procedures to protect human rights. See id. at 191. 
235 See id. at 208, 210, 220–23, 242–45. For example, the Jamaica Public Defender rec-
ommends that some complainants litigate constitutional rights issues and helps those 
complainants by compiling a list of pre-approved barristers who are qualified to litigate the 
issue and by administering a legal aid fund that pays for such litigation. See id. at 210. The 
Seychelles Ombudsman assists complainants in human rights charter litigation and may 
become a party to proceedings with leave of the court. See id. at 222 n.44. 
236 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. In civil law countries, the constitutional 
court is considered to be outside the judicial branch of government and has the power to 
make legally binding decisions. See Lisa Hilbink, Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New 
Constitutionalism, 65 Md. L. Rev. 15, 22–23 (2006). A separate administrative court system 
exists in many civil law jurisdictions. See id.; see also European Ombudsman-Institutions, 
supra note 10, at 25–26. In a common law country, important legal issues are usually liti-
gated in the general court system and appealed to a supreme court for final determina-
tion. See Edward McWhinney, Supreme Courts and Judicial Law-Making: Constitu-
tional Tribunals and Constitutional Review xv, 1–3, 23–24 (1986). 
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man rights ombudsmen in common law jurisdictions may be more ap-
propriate. Similarly, research is needed to determine whether more 
civil law states without constitutional courts, such as Scandinavian na-
tions, could effectively add these types of litigation mandates to their 
ombudsman institutions. 
G. Annual Reporting, Other Reports, Website Content, and Other Tools 
 A human rights ombudsman’s reports and website are easy meth-
ods to provide useful information and assistance to the public. Annual 
and special reports can provide information on the important investi-
gations undertaken by the ombudsman, which may increase public un-
derstanding of the ombudsman’s role and the number of future com-
plaints to the office.237 Moreover, reports may enhance the public per-
ception of the usefulness of the institution.238 The ombudsman can 
also publicize and use reports in particular cases to persuade govern-
ment authorities to change law and policy.239 Ombudsman offices that 
have OPCAT NPM status also need to describe the nature of this work 
in their annual reports or establish a separate reporting system. 
                                                                                                                     
 Many ombudsman institutions have websites that provide public 
information regarding the activities of the office. These websites dem-
onstrate the framework of the institution and what types of complaints it 
can investigate. Typically, they provide access to annual and special re-
ports as well as to other relevant publications. Some websites also act as a 
means for members of the public to submit complaints to the ombuds-
man.240 Human rights ombudsmen go further and use their websites to 
enhance their human rights protection and promotion functions. Some 
post their public education publications on their websites. The website 
for Bolivia’s Defensor del Pueblo provides a worthy example: it has numer-
ous publications on topics such as discrimination, racism, indigenous 
 
237 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 49. 
238 See id. at 49–50; Reif, supra note 1, at 404, 407. 
239 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 49–50. The investiga-
tive reports and public relations methodology of the Ontario Ombudsman Special Om-
budsman Response Team is a good example of this phenomenon. See Reif, supra note 158, 
at 34. Further, annual reports can also be organized to highlight the human rights work of 
the multiple-mandate ombudsman by separating specific human rights issues into differ-
ent chapters or sections. See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 504. 
240 See, e.g., Greek Ombudsman, supra note 183; The Parliamentary Ombudsman—JO, su-
pra note 183. 
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rights, children’s rights, and women’s rights.241 Human rights ombuds-
men focusing on children often have a special section of their website 
designed for use by children with child-friendly language and design 
features. For example, the website of Catalonia’s Síndic de Greuges, which 
has a Deputy Ombudsman for Children, contains a special section for 
minors.242 It enables children and youth to submit their own complaints 
and opinions to the Síndic by e-mail and contains educational materials 
on children’s rights.243 
 A few human rights ombudsman institutions may also have the 
resources for regular radio or television shows. These programs are ca-
pable of widely disseminating information about their work and human 
rights throughout the country. Argentina’s Defensor del Pueblo is one 
such institution.244 Peru’s Defensor del Pueblo, in its early years of opera-
tion, obtained funding to create a television infomercial to inform the 
viewing public about the nature of their rights and about the scope of 
the institution’s ability to take complaints.245 
H. Promoting State Compliance with Human Rights Treaties, Human Rights 
Law Reform, Research, and Education 
 A number of human rights ombudsman institutions have the re-
sponsibility to improve the contents of domestic human rights law and 
may recommend that the state accede to or ratify human rights trea-
ties.246 In connection with this responsibility, a human rights ombuds-
man may also be empowered to make law reform proposals and may 
even become involved in the amendment process.247 Latin American 
institutions often have these duties.248 A few European human rights 
ombudsmen perform similar functions.249 
                                                                                                                      
 
241 See Materiales Producidos, Defensoría del Pueblo, http://www.defensoria.gob.bo/ 
(follow “Promocion y Educacion” hyperlink; then follow “Materiales Producidos” hyper-
link) (last visited May 8, 2011). 
242 See El Defensor d’Infants i Adolescents, Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya (Spain), 
http://www.sindic.cat/ca/page.asp?id=113 (last visited May 8, 2011). 
243 See id. The website for the human rights ombudsman in Andalusia, Spain has simi-
lar sections. See Defensor del Menor de Andalucía, supra note 159. 
244 See Prensa, Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación Argentina, http://www.dpn.gob. 
ar/main.php?cnt=40 (last visited May 8, 2011). 
245 See Ombudsman’s Office: Protects your rights (Ombudsman’s Office of Peru, 
USAID) (videocassette) (on file with author). 
246 See Reif, supra note 1, at 139, 190 n.124, 201–02, 262. 
247 See id. at 188–90 nn.116–27. 
248 See id. For example, the human rights ombudsmen in Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Paraguay all have these duties. See 
id. at 188–90 nn.116–27, 201–02, 262 (Peru: promote signature of treaties, propose new 
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 Some human rights ombudsman institutions are empowered to 
engage in human rights research, to conduct studies, and to engage in 
human rights education.250 The educational efforts may be directed at 
public officials or the broader public.251 Again, a number of Latin 
American institutions, along with a few European ombudsmen, have 
these human rights education mandates.252 
 In contrast to the potential difficulties of transporting human 
rights ombudsman litigation mandates from civil law systems to other 
legal systems, human rights research and education mandates can be 
provided to human rights ombudsman institutions in all types of legal 
systems. Full implementation of these such mandates is more likely 
contingent on sufficient resources. 
Conclusion 
 The number of human rights ombudsman institutions has ex-
ploded over the course of the last three decades. They now account for 
at least fifty percent of the total number of ombudsman institutions 
worldwide. Human rights ombudsmen are prevalent in Latin America 
as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, but are increasingly found in 
Western Europe and other regions as well. There are many forces that 
will continue to drive nations to establish human rights ombudsman 
institutions. These include democratization, public institution-building 
or -rebuilding, comparative law influences, limited state resources, and 
international human rights law—in particular, the movement to estab-
lish NHRIs. Additionally, the continuing development of international 
human rights law will increase the pressure on states either to expand 
the mandates of human rights ombudsman institutions or to give ex-
press human rights duties to classical ombudsman institutions. While 
most human rights ombudsmen are found in civil law jurisdictions, 
some of these forces may lead to a greater number of these institutions 
in common law jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                      
laws, become involved in legislative process; Costa Rica: make law reform proposals; El 
Salvador: make law reform proposals, issue opinions on draft laws; Nicaragua: promote law 
reform, encourage treaty ratification; Panama: promote law reform; Bolivia: promote law 
reform proposals, encourage treaty ratification; Venezuela: promote law reform; Paraguay: 
promote law reform). 
249 See European Ombudsman-Institutions, supra note 10, at 56–57. 
250 See id. at 57. 
251 See id. 
252 See id.; Reif, supra note 1, at 188 nn.118–20, 190 nn.123–26, 193, 262 (listing El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, 
and Paraguay as examples). 
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 Some human rights ombudsman institutions have both adminis-
trative justice and human rights protection mandates while others 
stand much closer to the human rights commission model. There is 
considerable variation in the scope of the core powers given to and op-
erating practices instituted by human rights ombudsman institutions. 
Excluding other factors that influence the degree of functional success 
of a human rights ombudsman transplant, a human rights ombudsman 
should be given wide jurisdiction over a spectrum of human rights and 
government actors. Such jurisdiction should include own-motion inves-
tigatory powers, inspection powers, and possibly deputy ombudsmen to 
focus on special human rights concerns such as children’s rights, 
women’s rights, and the protection of ethnic minorities. Additional 
human rights protection and promotion powers such as taking cases to 
constitutional or administrative courts, prosecuting public officials, 
lobbying government bodies to implement human rights treaties, and 
monitoring the state’s implementation of its international human 
rights obligations, law reform activities, and human rights research and 
education enhance the ombudsman’s core investigatory mandate. Gov-
ernments should endow a human rights ombudsman with these addi-
tional functions and powers when the nature of the country’s legal sys-
tem and the institutional structure of the state permit. Human rights 
ombudsman institutions with the power to litigate legal questions in the 
courts exist almost entirely in civil law jurisdictions; thus, further in-
quiry is needed to determine whether human rights ombudsman insti-
tutions established in common law or mixed systems could be given 
equivalent mandates. 
 Finally, all human rights ombudsman institutions must institute 
operating practices that further their ability to protect and promote 
human rights. Such practices could include the designation of units or 
departments for human rights matters, the employment of a diverse 
staff with appropriate human rights expertise, and the dynamic use of 
annual and special reports. In addition, the use of a website and the 
media to publicize the human rights jurisdiction of the office will help 
to inform the public about the human rights norms binding the state 
and ensure that the public utilizes the ombudsman in cases of human 
rights violations. 
